Reference health

<div> Does analyst participation in earnings conference calls <span>curb real activities earnings management?</span> </div>

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4029126
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32/32 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-14

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

7 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 32 checked references that resolve
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Modeling Discretionary Accrual Reversal and the Balance Sheet as an Earnings Management Constraint
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Making Sense of Cents: An Examination of Firms That Marginally Miss or Beat Analyst Forecasts
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Understanding the “numbers game”
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US Managers' Use of ‘Pro Forma’ Adjustments to Meet Strategic Earnings Targets
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Inside the “Black Box” of Sell‐Side Financial Analysts
resolves10.1016/S0165-4101(97)00017-7
Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses
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Earnings Management to Avoid Losses and Earnings Decreases: Are Analysts Fooled?*
resolves10.1016/j.jacceco.2016.12.002
Earnings expectations and employee safety
resolves10.1007/s11142-018-9453-3
Manager-analyst conversations in earnings conference calls
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.10.002
Do analysts matter for governance? Evidence from natural experiments
resolves10.2308/accr.2008.83.3.757
Real and Accrual-Based Earnings Management in the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Periods
resolves10.1506/car.25.2.6
Earnings Management through Effective Tax Rates: The Effects of Tax‐Planning Investment and the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002*
resolves10.1506/car.26.3.7
Quarterly Earnings Patterns and Earnings Management*
resolves10.1016/j.jacceco.2013.03.002
Do managers define non-GAAP earnings to meet or beat analyst forecasts?
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01614.x
Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?
resolves10.1016/j.jacceco.2003.09.001
Impact of firm performance expectations on CEO turnover and replacement decisions
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The economic implications of corporate financial reporting
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.02.021
Monitoring and corporate disclosure: Evidence from a natural experiment
resolves10.1111/j.1475-679X.2009.00354.x
Does the Stock Market See a Zero or Small Positive Earnings Surprise as a Red Flag?
resolves10.1506/car.25.4.5
Meeting or Beating Analyst Expectations in the Post‐Scandals World: Changes in Stock Market Rewards and Managerial Actions*
resolves10.2308/accr-51153
Managing for the Moment: The Role of Earnings Management via Real Activities versus Accruals in SEO Valuation
resolves10.2308/accr.00000009
Can Big 4 versus Non-Big 4 Differences in Audit-Quality Proxies Be Attributed to Client Characteristics?
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01625.x
When Is a Liability Not a Liability? Textual Analysis, Dictionaries, and 10‐Ks
resolves10.2308/accr.2001.76.3.313
The Effect of Missing a Quarterly Earnings Benchmark on the CEO's Annual Bonus
resolves10.1111/j.1475-679X.2008.00285.x
Evidence of Management Discrimination Among Analysts during Earnings Conference Calls
resolves10.1023/A:1009668711298
Analyst Forecasting Ability and the Stock Price Reaction to Forecast Revisions
resolves10.1007/s11142-021-09602-y
Financial misconduct and employee mistreatment: Evidence from wage theft
resolves10.1016/j.jacceco.2006.01.002
Earnings management through real activities manipulation
resolves10.2307/2491386
Why Firms Voluntarily Disclose Bad News
resolves10.1007/s11142-019-09505-z
Improving the measures of real earnings management
resolves10.2308/accr-51281
Real Earnings Management and Long-Term Operating Performance: The Role of Reversals in Discretionary Investment Cuts
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.05.008
Analyst coverage and earnings management
The 7 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedThe effect of concern about reported income on discretionary spending decisions: The case of research and development
no DOI — not checkedThe influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D investment behavior
no DOI — not checkedref14
no DOI — not checkedref22
no DOI — not checkedref23
no DOI — not checkedTo warn or not to warn: Management disclosures in the face of an earnings surprise
no DOI — not checkedPublic Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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