Reference health
School Choice
83/83 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-28
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
49 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 83 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1016/S0304-4076(02)00201-4
Semiparametric instrumental variable estimation of treatment response models
resolves10.1257/aer.20151425
The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match
resolves10.1093/qje/qjr017
Accountability and Flexibility in Public Schools: Evidence from Boston's Charters And Pilots
resolves10.3982/ECTA13925
Research Design Meets Market Design: Using Centralized Assignment for Impact Evaluation
resolves10.1257/aer.101.1.399
Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: The “Boston Mechanism” Reconsidered
resolves10.1257/aer.99.5.1954
Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match
resolves10.2307/2998580
Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
resolves10.3982/ECTA13615
Demand Analysis Using Strategic Reports: An Application to a School Choice Mechanism
resolves10.1007/BF01215380
Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2010.12.005
Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: The Top Trading Absorbing Sets mechanisms
resolves10.1257/aer.p20171049
Large-Scale Affirmative Action in School Choice: Admissions to IITs in India
resolves10.3982/TE4137
Comparing school choice and college admissions mechanisms by their strategic accessibility
resolves10.1086/704573
Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: The Boston Mechanism versus Its Alternatives
resolves10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.04.001
Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: Characterizations and an affirmative action application
resolves10.1016/j.jet.2013.12.011
Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods
resolves10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.004
School choice with controlled choice constraints: Hard bounds versus soft bounds
resolves10.1257/aer.98.3.669
What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice
resolves10.1007/s10683-020-09667-7
Experiments on centralized school choice and college admissions: a survey
resolves10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.017
The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects
resolves10.3982/TE3621
School choice with asymmetric information: Priority design and the curse of acceptance
resolves10.1007/s00355-006-0139-6
Mixed Strategies in Games of Capacity Manipulation in Hospital–Intern Markets
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2015.12.004
Two school systems, one district: What to do when a unified admissions process is impossible
resolves10.1257/aer.98.4.1636
Leveling the Playing Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism
resolves10.1257/aer.103.1.80
School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by their Vulnerability to Manipulation
resolves10.1086/261272
The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory
resolves10.1016/0022-0531(85)90106-1
The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
resolves10.2307/1913160
On the Allocation of Residents to Rural Hospitals: A General Property of Two-Sided Matching Markets
resolves10.1111/1468-0262.00335
The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
resolves10.1016/0304-4068(77)90004-0
Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
The 49 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref3
no DOI — not checkedref7
no DOI — not checkedMinimizing justified envy in school choice: The design of New Orleans
no DOI — not checkedEfficiency, justiffied envy, and incentives in priority-based matching
no DOI — not checkedEfficiency, justified envy, and incentives in priority-based matching
no DOI — not checkedref11
no DOI — not checkedref13
no DOI — not checkedref22
no DOI — not checkedref26
no DOI — not checkedStrategy-proofness in the large
no DOI — not checkedHousing markets with indifferences: a tale of two mechanisms
no DOI — not checkedref34
no DOI — not checkedManipulability of stable mechanisms
no DOI — not checkedA modification aimed at reducing the manipulability and inefficiency of the boston school choice mechanism
no DOI — not checkedRobust minimal instability of the top trading cycles mechanism
no DOI — not checkedref45
no DOI — not checkedref46
no DOI — not checkedThe Demise of Walk Zones in Boston: Priorities vs
no DOI — not checkedIdentifying the harm of manipulable school choice mechanisms
no DOI — not checkedThe secure Boston mechanism: Theory and experiments
no DOI — not checkedref52
no DOI — not checkedDeduction dilemmas: The Taiwan assignment mechanism
no DOI — not checkedref54
no DOI — not checkedref56
no DOI — not checkedref57
no DOI — not checkedref63
no DOI — not checkedref67
no DOI — not checkedBeyond truth-telling: Preference estimation with centralized school choice and college admissions
no DOI — not checkedref71
no DOI — not checkedref72
no DOI — not checkedref76
no DOI — not checkedref77
no DOI — not checkedGaming the Boston school choice mechanism in Beijing
no DOI — not checkedref81
no DOI — not checkedref82
no DOI — not checkedref86
no DOI — not checkedref88
no DOI — not checkedStable marriage assignment for unequal sets
no DOI — not checkedref97
no DOI — not checkedref98
no DOI — not checkedref102
no DOI — not checkedref103
no DOI — not checkedref104
no DOI — not checkedA natural experiment in the organization of entry level labor markets: Regional markets for new physicians and surgeons in the U.K
no DOI — not checkedDeferred acceptance algorithms: History, theory, practice, and open questions
no DOI — not checkedref119
no DOI — not checkedref126
no DOI — not checkedQueue allocation of indivisible goods
no DOI — not checkedref131
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