Reference health

Intermediary capitalization and asset demand

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4066011
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56/56 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

37 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 56 checked references that resolve
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Do Intermediaries Matter for Aggregate Asset Prices?
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no DOI — not checkedMarket liquidity after the financial crisis
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no DOI — not checkedThe industrial organization of financial markets
no DOI — not checkedIntermediary balance sheets and the Treasury yield curve
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no DOI — not checkedBidding for contracts under uncertain demand: Skewed bidding and risk sharing
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no DOI — not checkedRegulation and market liquidity
no DOI — not checkedStrategic supply function competition with private information
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no DOI — not checkedConnecting disconnected financial markets?
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