Reference health

<div> Cartel fines in India 2009-2021: <span>The role of recidivism and fining metrics</span> </div>

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4071152
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26/26 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-28

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

25 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 26 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1007/s11151-018-9633-0
The Chilean Anti-cartel Experience: Accomplishments and Challenges
resolves10.1111/ecoj.12079
The Distortive Effects of Antitrust Fines Based on Revenue
resolves10.1177/0951692899011004001
Collusion, Competition and Democracy
resolves10.1093/jaenfo/jns009
Justifying criminal sanctions for cartel conduct: a hard case
resolves10.1080/24730580.2022.2140909
Sweeter carrots, same stick: transplanting leniency plus into Indian competition law
resolves10.1007/978-3-031-24938-9_9
Neither Crime Nor (Much) Punishment: India’s Cartel Penalty Practices
resolves10.1093/jleo/ewv006
Trust, Leniency, and Deterrence
resolves10.1016/j.ijindorg.2009.02.007
An empirical study of the European corporate leniency program
resolves10.1016/S0573-8555(06)82004-3
Chapter 4 Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers. Should Price Fixers still Go to Prison?
resolves10.1007/s10842-006-0028-9
Effectiveness of Antitrust Sanctions on Modern International Cartels
resolves10.1111/joie.12014
Corporate Leniency Programs when Firms have Private Information: The Push of Prosecution and the Pull of Pre‐emption
resolves10.1111/j.1467-6451.2008.00339.x
OPTIMAL CORPORATE LENIENCY PROGRAMS<sup>*</sup>
resolves10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.07.007
Penalizing cartels: The case for basing penalties on price overcharge
resolves10.1007/s11151-019-09738-x
Penalising on the Basis of the Severity of the Offence: A Sophisticated Revenue-Based Cartel Penalty
resolves10.1093/jaenfo/jny014
Serial collusion by multi-product firms
resolves10.2307/1599506
Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations
resolves10.1016/j.ijindorg.2012.04.004
Leniency programs for multimarket firms: The effect of Amnesty Plus on cartel formation
resolves10.1086/657660
Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: Determinants of Cartel Duration
resolves10.1093/joclec/nhx025
LENIENCY, COLLUSION, CORRUPTION, AND WHISTLEBLOWING
resolves10.7551/mitpress/9011.001.0001
The Economics of Collusion
resolves10.1093/jaenfo/jnu008
Effects of antitrust leniency on concealment effort by colluding firms
resolves10.1257/aer.99.3.750
Strategic Leniency and Cartel Enforcement
resolves10.1016/S0167-7187(02)00057-7
Leniency programs and cartel prosecution
resolves10.1007/s11151-022-09862-1
Characteristics of Prosecuted Cartels and Cartel Enforcement in South Africa
resolves10.1111/joie.12155
Cartel Attributes and Cartel Performance: The Impact of Trade Associations
resolves10.5235/ecj.v5n1.19
Sanctioning Cartel Activity: Let the Punishment Fit the Crime
The 25 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref1
no DOI — not checkedThe CCI's Leniency Program: Shortcomings and Solutions
no DOI — not checkedRelative Performance Evaluation, Sabotage and Collusion
no DOI — not checkedThe Drivers of Antitrust Effectiveness
no DOI — not checkedWhy India Adopted a New Competition Law
no DOI — not checkedRecidivism Revealed: Private International Cartels 1990-2009
no DOI — not checkedref17
no DOI — not checkedWhat can the duration of discovered cartels tell us about the duration of all cartels?
no DOI — not checkedImpact of MRTP act for development of nation-a study
no DOI — not checkedref22
no DOI — not checkedref27
no DOI — not checkedref29
no DOI — not checkedThe EU Leniency Programme and Recidivism
no DOI — not checkedLeniency Inflation, Cartel Damages, and Criminalization
no DOI — not checkedref36
no DOI — not checkedThe MRTP amendment bill: A trojan horse
no DOI — not checkedIndia's New Competition Regime Steadily Gaining Ground
no DOI — not checkedCartel leniency programme in india-why no race here?
no DOI — not checkedref44
no DOI — not checkedLeniency and Whistleblowers in Antitrust
no DOI — not checkedref46
no DOI — not checkedref47
no DOI — not checkedref48
no DOI — not checkedA Principled Argument for Personal Criminal Sanctions as Punishment Under EC Cartel Law
no DOI — not checkedref51
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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