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Incentives and Peer Effects in the Workplace: On the Impact of Envy and Wage Transparency on Organizational Design

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4094104
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56/56 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-02

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

22 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

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no DOI — not checkedOn the books, off the record: Examining the effectiveness of pay secrecy laws in the U.S. Policy Brief IWPR #C494
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