Reference health
Tax Knowledge and Tax Manipulation: A Unifying Model
11/11 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
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The 11 checked references that resolve
The 29 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedComplex Tax Incentives
no DOI — not checkedThe Economics of 'Tagging' as Applied to the Optimal Income Tax, Welfare Programs, and Manpower Planning
no DOI — not checkedThe Ability Gradient in Tax Tesponsiveness
no DOI — not checkedref5
no DOI — not checkedref6
no DOI — not checkedref8
no DOI — not checkedref9
no DOI — not checkedHeard It Through the Grapevine: The Direct and Network Effects of a Tax Enforcement Field Experiment on Firms
no DOI — not checkedThe Economics of Tax Policy Towards Savings
no DOI — not checkedUsing Differences in Knowledge across Neighborhoods to Uncover the Impacts of the EITC on Earnings
no DOI — not checkedThe Take-up of Social Benefits
no DOI — not checkedPaternalism and Pseudo-Rationality
no DOI — not checkedSufficient Statistics for Nonlinear Tax Systems with Preference Heterogeneity
no DOI — not checkedref19
no DOI — not checkedOptimal taxation when people do not maximize well-being
no DOI — not checkedOptimal Defaults with Normative Ambiguity
no DOI — not checkedTax Evasion at the Top of the Income Distribution: Theory and Evidence
no DOI — not checkedEfficient Social Welfare Weights
no DOI — not checkedTaxpayer Search for Information: Implications for Rational Attention
no DOI — not checkedref26
no DOI — not checkedref29
no DOI — not checkedref30
no DOI — not checkedOptimal Income Taxation with Present Bias
no DOI — not checkedOptimal Tax Systems with Endogenous Behavioral Biases
no DOI — not checkedRules of Thumb and Attention Elasticities: Evidence from Under-and Overreaction to Taxes
no DOI — not checkedOptimal Paternalistic Savings Policies
no DOI — not checkedref37
no DOI — not checkedTaxes and Mistakes: What's in a Sufficient Statistic?
no DOI — not checkedAttention Variation and Welfare: Theory and Evidence from a Tax Salience Experiment
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