Reference health

CEO Bargaining Power and Compensation

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4163168
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38/38 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-28

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

2 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 38 checked references that resolve
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Determinants of CEO compensation: Generalist–specialist versus insider–outsider attributes
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Enforceability of non-compete covenants, discretionary investments, and financial reporting practices: Evidence from a natural experiment
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Ex Post Bargaining, Corporate Cash Holdings, and Executive Compensation
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Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance
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CEO contract design: How do strong principals do it?
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When are outside directors effective?☆
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The impact of firm prestige on executive compensation
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resolves10.1093/jleo/ewp033
Ties that Truly Bind: Noncompetition Agreements, Executive Compensation, and Firm Investment
resolves10.1111/jofi.12046
Opening the Black Box: Internal Capital Markets and Managerial Power
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Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2020.04.007
CEO-board dynamics
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CEO compensation and incentives: Evidence from M&A bonuses
resolves10.1017/S0022109017000072
The Effect of Labor Unions on CEO Compensation
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Does Corporate Governance Matter More for High Financial Slack Firms?
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Institutional and Legal Context in Natural Experiments: The Case of State Antitakeover Laws
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Trade Secrets Law and Corporate Disclosure: Causal Evidence on the Proprietary Cost Hypothesis
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On the Timing of CEO Stock Option Awards
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Superstar CEOs <sup>*</sup>
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Are All Inside Directors the Same? Evidence from the External Directorship Market
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01687.x
Are Incentive Contracts Rigged by Powerful CEOs?
resolves10.1257/0002828041302262
CEO Pay and Appointments: A Market-Based Explanation for Recent Trends
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2020.03.007
CEOs’ outside opportunities and relative performance evaluation: evidence from a natural experiment
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhw033
CEO Investment Cycles
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resolves10.1016/B978-0-44-453594-8.00007-0
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Does CEO compensation reflect managerial ability or managerial power? Evidence from the compensation of powerful CEOs
The 2 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref6
no DOI — not checkedExecutive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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