Reference health

A Theoretical and Experimental Evaluation of Pay Transparency Policies and Payment Schemes

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4172506
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34/34 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-03

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

10 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 34 checked references that resolve
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The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment
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The importance of relative performance feedback information: Evidence from a natural experiment using high school students
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TEAM INCENTIVES: EVIDENCE FROM A FIRM LEVEL EXPERIMENT
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Relative performance or team evaluation? Optimal contracts for other-regarding agents
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Status Incentives
resolves10.1287/mnsc.1110.1383
Tournaments Without Prizes: Evidence from Personnel Records
resolves10.1093/qje/qjx041
The Morale Effects of Pay Inequality*
resolves10.1162/rest.90.3.414
Bootstrap-Based Improvements for Inference with Clustered Errors
resolves10.1257/aer.102.6.2981
Inequality at Work: The Effect of Peer Salaries on Job Satisfaction
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Experimental methods: Measuring effort in economics experiments
resolves10.1111/jeea.12079
SOCIAL COMPARISON AND EFFORT PROVISION: EVIDENCE FROM A FIELD EXPERIMENT
resolves10.1257/jep.38.1.153
Is Pay Transparency Good?
resolves10.3982/ECTA19788
Equilibrium Effects of Pay Transparency
resolves10.1016/j.jpubeco.2023.104890
The salary taboo privacy norms and the diffusion of information
resolves10.1093/restud/rdx033
What Motivates Effort? Evidence and Expert Forecasts
resolves10.1177/001872675400700202
A Theory of Social Comparison Processes
resolves10.1287/orsc.2017.1109
Pay Harmony? Social Comparison and Performance Compensation in Multibusiness Firms
resolves10.1287/mnsc.2017.2907
First-Place Loving and Last-Place Loathing: How Rank in the Distribution of Performance Affects Effort Provision
resolves10.1257/aer.102.1.469
A Structural Analysis of Disappointment Aversion in a Real Effort Competition
resolves10.1016/j.jbef.2018.11.003
Measuring costly effort using the slider task
resolves10.1016/j.econlet.2011.02.015
Wage transparency and performance: A real-effort experiment
resolves10.1007/s10683-015-9465-9
Combining “real effort” with induced effort costs: the ball-catching task
resolves10.1016/j.jebo.2010.08.008
Social comparison and performance: Experimental evidence on the fair wage–effort hypothesis
resolves10.2308/accr.2008.83.4.893
The Effects of Disseminating Relative Performance Feedback in Tournament and Individual Performance Compensation Plans
resolves10.1287/mnsc.2019.3461
Wage Transparency and Social Comparison in Sales Force Compensation
resolves10.1016/j.jeconom.2022.04.001
Cluster-robust inference: A guide to empirical practice
resolves10.1086/693137
Does Transparency Lead to Pay Compression?
resolves10.1086/518010
Contests for Status
resolves10.1287/mnsc.2014.1949
Bonus Payments and Reference Point Violations
resolves10.1287/mnsc.2013.1760
Optimal Design of Social Comparison Effects: Setting Reference Groups and Reference Points
resolves10.1093/qje/qjae004
The Role of the Ask Gap in Gender Pay Inequality
resolves10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01917.x
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resolves10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.05.004
Rank as an inherent incentive: Evidence from a field experiment
The 10 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref2
no DOI — not checkedPay transparency and the gender gap
no DOI — not checkedPay transparency and gender equality
no DOI — not checkedref13
no DOI — not checkedref21
no DOI — not checkedref23
no DOI — not checkedFeedback and motivation in dynamic tournaments
no DOI — not checkedPay transparency and inventor productivity: Evicence from state-level pay secrecy laws
no DOI — not checkedDoes pay transparency affect the gender wage gap? evidence from austria
no DOI — not checkedref36
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