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Organ Donation under Oath

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4174024
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37/37 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-03

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

2 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 37 checked references that resolve
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resolves10.1073/pnas.1211695109
The meaning of default options for potential organ donors
resolves10.1007/s10551-014-2504-1
Pledging Integrity: Oaths as Forms of Business Ethics Management
resolves10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199730568.001.0001
The Economist’s Oath
resolves10.1016/j.transproceed.2013.01.008
Presumed Consent Legislation Failed to Improve Organ Donation in Chile
resolves10.1257/aer.20180568
Paying for Kidneys? A Randomized Survey and Choice Experiment
resolves10.1016/j.econlet.2016.03.005
Can monetary incentives increase organ donations?
resolves10.1007/s10683-006-9159-4
z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments
resolves10.4236/aa.2019.91001
The Political Ritual, the Party and the People: A Perspective on Sinicization of Marxism in the New Democratic Revolution
resolves10.1016/j.jebo.2015.09.001
Organ donation in the lab: Preferences and votes on the priority rule
resolves10.1016/j.jebo.2018.12.006
How much priority bonus should be given to registered organ donors? An experimental analysis
resolves10.1287/mnsc.2017.2892
Truth Telling Under Oath
resolves10.1111/j.1751-9004.2007.00018.x
How Can People Be Induced to Willingly Change Their Behavior? The Path from Persuasive Communication to Binding Communication
resolves10.1126/science.1091721
Do Defaults Save Lives?
resolves10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.08.009
Professional norms and physician behavior: Homo oeconomicus or homo hippocraticus?
resolves10.1257/aer.102.5.2018
Organ Allocation Policy and the Decision to Donate
resolves10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.12.006
Loopholes undermine donation: An experiment motivated by an organ donation priority loophole in Israel
resolves10.1016/j.jhealeco.2013.10.006
Removing financial barriers to organ and bone marrow donation: The effect of leave and tax legislation in the U.S.
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resolves10.1016/j.jeem.2011.06.002
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resolves10.1016/j.jhealeco.2013.09.007
Increasing organ donation via changes in the default choice or allocation rule
resolves10.1016/j.jebo.2016.03.010
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resolves10.1016/j.jebo.2021.12.021
Remedying adverse selection in donor-priority rule using freeze period: Theory and experiment
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.005
Prioritized organ allocation rules under compatibility constraints
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Recommendations Implicit in Policy Defaults
resolves10.1016/j.joep.2016.12.007
The effects of extreme rituals on moral behavior: The performers-observers gap hypothesis
resolves10.1257/jep.21.3.37
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resolves10.1007/BF00055564
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resolves10.1353/bsp.2019.0005
Does changing defaults save lives? Effects of presumed consent organ donation policies
resolves10.1016/j.copsyc.2020.09.005
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Extreme Rituals Promote Prosociality
resolves10.1007/s10683-009-9230-z
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The 2 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedOrgan donation with vouchers
no DOI — not checkedref32
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