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Following the Actions of Others: The Simple Average of Strategies in a Rational Expectations Economy

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4185280
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39/39 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-16

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

10 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 39 checked references that resolve
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The social value of information with an endogenous public signal
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Social learning and costly information acquisition
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Information Linkages and Correlated Trading
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Reaching a Consensus
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Persuasion Bias, Social Influence, and Unidimensional Opinions
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Information aggregation in a noisy rational expectations economy
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Information Percolation With Equilibrium Search Dynamics
resolves10.1257/aer.97.2.203
Information Percolation in Large Markets
resolves10.1111/1475-679X.12019
Informational Feedback, Adverse Selection, and Optimal Disclosure Policy
resolves10.3982/ECTA13865
Aspirations and Inequality
resolves10.1146/annurev-financial-110716-032355
Information Disclosure in Financial Markets
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1976.tb01907.x
ON THE EFFICIENCY OF COMPETITIVE STOCK MARKETS WHERE TRADES HAVE DIVERSE INFORMATION
resolves10.1111/jofi.12768
Costly Information Acquisition, Social Networks, and Asset Prices: Experimental Evidence
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhw063
Peer Pressure: Social Interaction and the Disposition Effect
resolves10.1016/0022-0531(80)90056-3
On the aggregation of information in competitive markets
resolves10.1016/j.jet.2020.105156
Efficiency in trading markets with multi-dimensional signals
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00629.x
Social Interaction and Stock‐Market Participation
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00817.x
Thy Neighbor's Portfolio: Word‐of‐Mouth Effects in the Holdings and Trades of Money Managers
resolves10.1287/mnsc.2014.1975
Rational Information Leakage
resolves10.1515/9781400833993
Social and Economic Networks
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2012.06.001
Non-Bayesian social learning
resolves10.1016/j.jet.2015.02.005
Should we regulate financial information?
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.10.007
The value of diffusing information
resolves10.1007/s001990050346
Speculative securities
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A Theory of Non-Bayesian Social Learning
resolves10.1287/mnsc.2020.3871
Costly Interpretation of Asset Prices
resolves10.1257/000282802762024610
Social Value of Public Information
resolves10.1016/j.jet.2011.10.003
Asset pricing in large information networks
resolves10.1093/rfs/hht065
Investor Networks in the Stock Market
resolves10.1016/j.jet.2018.07.007
Information acquisition, price informativeness, and welfare
resolves10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00583.x
Information Acquisition and Under-Diversification
resolves10.2307/1912702
Aggregation of Information in Large Cournot Markets
resolves10.1006/game.1997.0562
Learning from Others: A Welfare Analysis
resolves10.1515/9781400829507
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resolves10.1093/res/rdw062
Endogenous Public Information and Welfare in Market Games
resolves10.1093/restud/rdy058
Trading, Profits, and Volatility in a Dynamic Information Network Model
The 10 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedInformation percolation
no DOI — not checkedNa�ve learning in social networks and the wisdom of crowds
no DOI — not checkedOn the impossibility of informationally efficient markets
no DOI — not checkedref20
no DOI — not checkedref29
no DOI — not checkedThe impact of a reference point determined by social comparison on wealth growth and inequality
no DOI — not checkedInformation sharing in a perfectly competitive market
no DOI — not checkedref40
no DOI — not checkedref42
no DOI — not checkedProtocols for secure computation
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