Reference health

Government Loan Guarantees, Market Liquidity, and Lending Standards

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4190431
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50/50 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

13 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 50 checked references that resolve
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resolves10.1007/s10679-004-2542-0
Exit Options in Corporate Finance: Liquidity versus Incentives
resolves10.1016/S0166-0462(03)00040-1
Have the GSE affordable housing goals increased the supply of mortgage credit?
resolves10.1016/j.jfi.2004.06.006
The institutional memory hypothesis and the procyclicality of bank lending behavior
resolves10.2307/2526573
Collateral and Rationing: Sorting Equilibria in Monopolistic and Competitive Credit Markets
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Do the GSEs matter to low-income housing markets? An assessment of the effects of the GSE loan purchase goals on California housing outcomes
resolves10.1016/j.jfi.2018.03.002
Learning by lending
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.03.011
Fintech, regulatory arbitrage, and the rise of shadow banks
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhy033
Housing Price Booms and Crowding-Out Effects in Bank Lending
resolves10.1111/jofi.12161
Skin in the Game and Moral Hazard
resolves10.1111/jofi.12866
Securitization, Ratings, and Credit Supply
resolves10.1257/aer.20140782
Banks as Secret Keepers
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhi008
The Pooling and Tranching of Securities: A Model of Informed Intermediation
resolves10.1006/juec.1998.2098
Incentives and Social Capital: Are Homeowners Better Citizens?
resolves10.1016/j.jmoneco.2016.06.003
Phasing out the GSEs
resolves10.1257/0895330054048687
Fussing and Fuming over Fannie and Freddie: How Much Smoke, How Much Fire?
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhz018
The Role of Technology in Mortgage Lending
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhu060
Securitization and the Fixed-Rate Mortgage
resolves10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.06.014
Do the GSEs expand the supply of mortgage credit? New evidence of crowd out in the secondary mortgage market
resolves10.1016/0047-2727(90)90011-6
Federal lending and the market for credit
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb05080.x
Financial Intermediaries and Liquidity Creation
resolves10.1016/0304-3932(95)01199-X
Banks and loan sales Marketing nonmarketable assets
resolves10.1006/juec.1996.2010
Measuring the Benefits of Homeowning: Effects on Children
resolves10.1016/j.jmoneco.2021.01.003
The marginal effect of government mortgage guarantees on homeownership
resolves10.7551/mitpress/9780262015783.001.0001
Inside and Outside Liquidity
resolves10.1257/aer.20151052
Regional Redistribution through the US Mortgage Market
resolves10.1016/0304-405X(87)90003-1
Some evidence on the uniqueness of bank loans
resolves10.1016/j.jmoneco.2013.09.001
Housing, mortgage bailout guarantees and the macro economy
resolves10.1162/qjec.2010.125.1.307
Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime Loans<sup>*</sup>
resolves10.1016/0304-3932(90)90025-Y
The dynamics of credit markets in a model with learning
resolves10.1006/juec.1993.1014
A Model of Redlining
resolves10.1006/juec.1998.2092
Information Externalities and Home Mortgage Underwriting
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01451.x
Securitization and the Declining Impact of Bank Finance on Loan Supply: Evidence from Mortgage Originations
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhq142
Informed and Uninformed Investment in Housing: The Downside of Diversification
resolves10.1016/0304-405X(89)90098-6
Further evidence on the bank lending process and the capital-market response to bank loan agreements
resolves10.2307/1885692
The Allocation of Credit and Financial Collapse
resolves10.1162/qjec.2009.124.4.1449
The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion: Evidence from the U.S. Mortgage Default Crisis <sup>*</sup>
resolves10.1023/A:1016573608747
The Effects of Purchases of Mortgages and Securitization by Government Sponsored Enterprises on Mortgage Yield Spreads and Volatility
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhq061
Credit Line Usage, Checking Account Activity, and Default Risk of Bank Borrowers
resolves10.1016/j.jfs.2013.01.005
Are lending relationships beneficial or harmful for public credit guarantees? Evidence from Japan's Emergency Credit Guarantee Program
resolves10.1023/A:1016529926494
The Role of Interest Rates in Influencing Long-Run Homeownership Rates
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01358.x
Loan Sales and Relationship Banking
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.08.004
Laying off credit risk: Loan sales versus credit default swaps
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6229.2005.00126.x
The GSE Implicit Subsidy and the Value of Government Ambiguity
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb03945.x
Loan Sales and the Cost of Bank Capital
resolves10.1111/j.1467-937X.2008.00526.x
Learning by Holding and Liquidity
resolves10.1007/s11151-016-9500-9
Crowding Out Effects of Refinancing on New Purchase Mortgages
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04708.x
The Value of Bank Durability: Borrowers as Bank Stakeholders
resolves10.1111/jofi.12519
The Downside of Asset Screening for Market Liquidity
resolves10.1016/j.jfi.2018.05.003
Government guarantees of loans to small businesses: Effects on banks’ risk-taking and non-guaranteed lending
The 13 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref3
no DOI — not checkedScreening vs. rationing in credit markets with imperfect information
no DOI — not checkedTransition to alternative structures for housing finance
no DOI — not checkedref15
no DOI — not checkedref20
no DOI — not checkedEconomic effects of federal credit programs
no DOI — not checkedMitigating information externalities in mortgage markets: The role of government-sponsored enterprises
no DOI — not checkedref32
no DOI — not checkedref54
no DOI — not checkedWhat to do about Fannie and Freddie: A primer on housing finance reform
no DOI — not checkedCredit rationing in markets with imperfect information
no DOI — not checkedTBA trading and liquidity in the agency MBS market
no DOI — not checkedref63
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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