Reference health
Artificial Collusion: Examining Supracompetitive Pricing by Q-Learning Algorithms
29/29 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
57 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 29 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1093/oxrep/grab011
Autonomous algorithmic collusion: economic research and policy implications
resolves10.1086/726906
Algorithmic Pricing and Competition: Empirical Evidence from the German Retail Gasoline Market
resolves10.1080/17441056.2020.1733344
Collusion by code or algorithmic collusion? When pricing algorithms take over
resolves10.1287/opre.2014.1341
Learning and Pricing with Models That Do Not Explicitly Incorporate Competition
resolves10.1016/j.sorms.2015.03.001
Dynamic pricing and learning: Historical origins, current research, and new directions
resolves10.1093/joclec/nhy016
DEVELOPING COMPETITION LAW FOR COLLUSION BY AUTONOMOUS ARTIFICIAL AGENTS†
resolves10.1093/epolic/eiae054
An economic test for an unlawful agreement to adopt a third-party’s pricing algorithm
resolves10.1111/1756-2171.12383
Autonomous algorithmic collusion: Q‐learning under sequential pricing
resolves10.1287/mnsc.1080.0936
Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Strategic Consumers and Oligopolistic Competition
resolves10.1287/msom.1110.0344
Pricing Multiple Products with the Multinomial Logit and Nested Logit Models: Concavity and Implications
resolves10.1287/mnsc.1120.1564
Dynamic Pricing Competition with Strategic Customers Under Vertical Product Differentiation
resolves10.1016/S0304-4068(02)00062-9
Convergence of Bayesian learning to general equilibrium in mis-specified models
The 57 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref2
no DOI — not checkedCollusion by mistake: Does algorithmic sophistication drive supra-competitive profits?
no DOI — not checkedref5
no DOI — not checkedref7
no DOI — not checkedArtificial intelligence and pricing: The impact of algorithm design
no DOI — not checkedThe impact of artificial intelligence design on pricing
no DOI — not checkedIntrinsic fluctuations of reinforcement learning promote cooperation
no DOI — not checkedThe Pitfalls of Pricing Algorithms: Be Mindful of How They Can Hurt Your Brand
no DOI — not checkedref17
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no DOI — not checkedref20
no DOI — not checkedStrategic choice of price-setting algorithms
no DOI — not checkedref24
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no DOI — not checkedref26
no DOI — not checkedAntitrust by Algorithm
no DOI — not checkedAlgorithms: How they can reduce competition and harm consumers
no DOI — not checkedref31
no DOI — not checkedref32
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no DOI — not checkedref35
no DOI — not checkedOn algorithmic collusion and reward-punishment schemes
no DOI — not checkedref37
no DOI — not checkedSustainable and Unchallenged Algorithmic Tacit Collusion
no DOI — not checkedref40
no DOI — not checkedref41
no DOI — not checkedAlgorithms as Illegal Agreements
no DOI — not checkedLimiting Algorithmic Coordination
no DOI — not checkedStrategic Responses to Algorithmic Recommendations: Evidence from Hotel Pricing
no DOI — not checkedref46
no DOI — not checkedref49
no DOI — not checkedref51
no DOI — not checkedref55
no DOI — not checkedref56
no DOI — not checkedref61
no DOI — not checkedDynamic Pricing, Intertemporal Spillovers, and Efficiency
no DOI — not checkedAlgorithmic Collusion: Reviving Section 5 of the FTC Act
no DOI — not checkedAntitrust and the Robo-Seller: Competition in the Time of Algorithms
no DOI — not checkedPrice Discrimination-Driven Algorithmic Collusion: Platforms for Durable Cartels
no DOI — not checkedref66
no DOI — not checkedQuantifying the likelihood of learning collusive strategy equilibria
no DOI — not checkedLearning to collude in a pricing duopoly
no DOI — not checkedLimiting dynamics for Q-learning with memory one in symmetric two-player, two-action games
no DOI — not checkedAlgorithms and Collusion: Competition Policy in the Digital Age
no DOI — not checkedAlgorithmic Competition: OECD Competition Policy Roundtable Background Note
no DOI — not checkedref72
no DOI — not checkedref75
no DOI — not checkedStatement of Interest of the United States in Re RealPage
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