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The Role of Financial Markets in the Unraveling of Credit

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4244296
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33/33 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

10 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 33 checked references that resolve
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Bubbles and Crashes
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Competition in Lending: Theory and Experiments
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Asset Pricing and Asymmetric Reasoning
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Chapter 80 Results from a Dozen Years of Election Futures Markets Research
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That's how we roll: An experiment on rollover risk
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Imperfect Choice or Imperfect Attention? Understanding Strategic Thinking in Private Information Games
resolves10.1016/S1364-6613(03)00094-9
Behavioural studies of strategic thinking in games
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Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
resolves10.1086/261155
Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
resolves10.1016/j.jet.2014.05.006
Information percolation in segmented markets
resolves10.1111/1468-0297.00027
Why Social Preferences Matter – the Impact of non‐Selfish Motives on Competition, Cooperation and Incentives
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1984.tb03887.x
Futures Markets and Informational Efficiency: A Laboratory Examination
resolves10.2307/2297195
An Introduction to the Theory of Rational Expectations Under Asymmetric Information
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhs004
Dynamic Debt Runs
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.07.002
Quiet bubbles
resolves10.1016/j.jebo.2021.01.009
Learning in speculative bubbles: Theory and experiment
resolves10.1257/aer.98.3.924
Thar She Blows: Can Bubbles Be Rekindled with Experienced Subjects?
resolves10.2307/1912767
Sequential Equilibria
resolves10.1257/aer.20191410
The Financial Transmission of Housing Booms: Evidence from Spain
resolves10.2307/2951567
An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
resolves10.3982/ECTA9433
The Bubble Game: An Experimental Study of Speculation
resolves10.1177/1043463104039876
Population Learning of Cooperative Behavior in a Three-Person Centipede Game
resolves10.1086/296675
Futures Contracting and Dividend Uncertainty in Experimental Asset Markets
resolves10.2307/1909407
Existence of Equilibrium of Plans, Prices, and Price Expectations in a Sequence of Markets
resolves10.2307/1910413
Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices
resolves10.1016/0022-0531(81)90018-1
Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
resolves10.1016/j.jfi.2008.06.002
On the dynamics and severity of bank runs: An experimental study
resolves10.2307/1911361
Bubbles, Crashes, and Endogenous Expectations in Experimental Spot Asset Markets
resolves10.1257/0895330041371321
Prediction Markets
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00799.x
Incentives, Contracts, and Markets: A General Equilibrium Theory of Firms
resolves10.1111/1468-0327.12014
The Greek debt restructuring: an autopsy
The 10 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref3
no DOI — not checkedOn the economic impacts of mortgage credit expansion policies: Evidence from help to buy
no DOI — not checkedWhat price coordination? the efficiencyenhancing effect of auctioning the right to play
no DOI — not checkedMarket efficiency, long-term returns, and behavioral finance
no DOI — not checkedOn the impossibility of informationally efficient markets
no DOI — not checkedref21
no DOI — not checkedref26
no DOI — not checkedref28
no DOI — not checkedref33
no DOI — not checkedref39
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