Reference health

Optimal Managerial Authority

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4260822
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64/64 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

17 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 64 checked references that resolve
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The 17 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref21
no DOI — not checkedref28
no DOI — not checkedref36
no DOI — not checkedCEO-board dynamics
no DOI — not checkedref41
no DOI — not checkedEndogenously chosen boards of directors and their monitoring of the ceo
no DOI — not checkedDynamic multitasking and managerial investment incentives
no DOI — not checkedOn the theory of delegation
no DOI — not checkedref50
no DOI — not checkedPolitics, delegation, and bureaucracy
no DOI — not checkedPerformance-induced CEO turnover
no DOI — not checkedref57
no DOI — not checkedPower dynamics in organizations
no DOI — not checkedref68
no DOI — not checkedref71
no DOI — not checkedEquilibrium unemployment as a worker discipline device
no DOI — not checkedref79
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