Reference health

Input Price Discrimination, Contract Unobservability, and Technology Adoption

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4339371
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24/24 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

13 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 24 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1016/S0167-7187(02)00010-3
Downstream R&D, raising rivals’ costs, and input price contracts
resolves10.1287/mnsc.35.2.226
On Credible Delegation by Oligopolists: A Discussion of Distribution Channel Management
resolves10.2307/2527106
Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
resolves10.1111/1756-2171.12272
Vertical relations, opportunism, and welfare
resolves10.1111/joie.12306
Input Price Discrimination, Demand Forms, And Welfare*
resolves10.1086/705329
Transparency and Negotiated Prices: The Value of Information in Hospital-Supplier Bargaining
resolves10.1111/ecoj.12061
Price Discrimination in Input Markets: Quantity Discounts and Private Information
resolves10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00083.x
Market power, price discrimination, and allocative efficiency in intermediate‐goods markets
resolves10.2307/2601049
Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments
resolves10.1016/j.respol.2016.03.003
Bundling of RAND-committed patents
resolves10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110697
Input price discrimination can encourage downstream investment and increase welfare
resolves10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.032
Timing of investments and third degree price discrimination in intermediate good markets
resolves10.1111/1756-2171.12043
The welfare effects of third‐degree price discrimination in intermediate good markets: the case of bargaining
resolves10.2307/2555864
Vertical Control with Bilateral Contracts
resolves10.1111/joie.12303
Input Price Discrimination, Two‐Part Tariffs and Bargaining*
resolves10.1016/S1573-448X(06)03033-0
Chapter 33 A Primer on Foreclosure
resolves10.1111/1468-0262.00425
Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities
resolves10.2307/2555525
Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly
resolves10.1016/j.respol.2016.03.010
Hospitals as innovators in the health-care system: A literature review and research agenda
resolves10.1007/s11151-008-9165-0
Long-Term Contracts and Asset Specificity Revisited: An Empirical Analysis of Producer–Importer Relations in the Natural Gas Industry
resolves10.1086/670401
Pass-Through as an Economic Tool: Principles of Incidence under Imperfect Competition
resolves10.1016/j.jhealeco.2019.06.001
Provider responses to online price transparency
resolves10.1016/j.jebo.2006.02.007
Contract duration and the division of labor in agricultural land leases
resolves10.1257/aer.90.1.240
Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Input Markets: Output and Welfare
The 13 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref1
no DOI — not checkedLinear demand systems for differentiated goods: Overview and user's guide
no DOI — not checkedInput market price discrimination and the choice of technology
no DOI — not checkedMost-favored-customer clauses and multilateral contracting: When nondiscrimination implies uniformity
no DOI — not checkedExclusivity clauses and best price policies in input markets
no DOI — not checkedPrice discrimination and bargaining: Empirical evidence from medical devices
no DOI — not checkedVertical integration and market foreclosure. Brookings papers on economic activity
no DOI — not checkedThe welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination in intermediate good markets
no DOI — not checkedObservable contracts as commitments: Interdependent contracts and moral hazard
no DOI — not checkedOpportunism in vertical contracting: Nondiscrimination, exclusivity, and uniformity
no DOI — not checkedref24
no DOI — not checkedThe welfare effects of forbidding discriminatory discounts: A secondary line analysis of robinson-patman
no DOI — not checkedref37
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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