Reference health

Is Bank CEO Pay Sensitive to Operational Risk Event Announcements?

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4343911
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60/60 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-25

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

30 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

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no DOI — not checkedBasel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), 2001b. Working paper on the regulatory treatment of operational risk
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no DOI — not checkedSo that's operational risk! How operational risk in mortgage-backed securities almost destroyed the world's financial markets and what we can do about it. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
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