Reference health
Tax Design, Information, and Elasticities: Evidence From the French Wealth Tax
18/18 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-25
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
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The 18 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1257/aer.20201237
Tax Administration versus Tax Rates: Evidence from Corporate Taxation in Indonesia
resolves10.3386/w22207
The Long-term Consequences of Teacher Discretion in Grading of High-stakes Tests
resolves10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.10.004
The effect of tax enforcement on tax elasticities: Evidence from charitable contributions in France
resolves10.1086/261994
The Effect of Marginal Tax Rates on Taxable Income: A Panel Study of the 1986 Tax Reform Act
resolves10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.09.016
Behavioral responses to inheritance tax: Evidence from notches in France
resolves10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.02.003
Compliance costs vs. tax incentives: Why do entrepreneurs respond to size-based regulations?
resolves10.1093/qje/qjz032
Wealth Taxation and Wealth Accumulation: Theory and Evidence From Denmark*
resolves10.1093/qje/qjt004
Using Notches to Uncover Optimization Frictions and Structural Elasticities: Theory and Evidence from Pakistan
*
resolves10.1086/713096
How to Improve Tax Compliance? Evidence from Population-Wide Experiments in Belgium
resolves10.1257/aer.20130393
No Taxation without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement in the Value Added Tax
The 25 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref1
no DOI — not checkedref2
no DOI — not checkedUnder the radar: The effects of monitoring firms on tax compliance
no DOI — not checkedEscape or play again? How retiring entrepreneurs respond to the wealth tax
no DOI — not checkedCorporate taxation under weak enforcement
no DOI — not checkedHow taxing is tax filing? using revealed preferences to estimate compliance costs
no DOI — not checkedDo people really want a simple tax system? Evidence on preferences towards income tax simplification
no DOI — not checkedref11
no DOI — not checkedTaxing property in developing countries: Theory and evidence from mexico
no DOI — not checkedBehavioral Responses to Wealth Taxes: Evidence from Switzerland
no DOI — not checkedIs charitable giving political? New evidence from wealth and income tax returns
no DOI — not checkedref16
no DOI — not checkedref18
no DOI — not checkedref19
no DOI — not checkedTax Evasion at the Top of the Income Distribution: Theory and Evidence
no DOI — not checkedTaxing Hidden Wealth: The Consequences of U.S. Enforcement Initiatives for Evasive Foreign Accounts
no DOI — not checkedUnwilling or unable to cheat? Evidence from a tax audit experiment in Denmark
no DOI — not checkedref32
no DOI — not checkedref33
no DOI — not checkedref35
no DOI — not checkedDo taxpayers bunch at kink points?
no DOI — not checkedBehavioral responses to wealth taxes: Evidence from Sweden
no DOI — not checkedThe costs of corporate tax complexity
no DOI — not checkedref42
no DOI — not checkedThis figure groups households into bins of e10,000 of taxable wealth and plots the bin counts around the exemption threshold each year (vertical red lines). Panel A shows the distribution of taxpayers relative to the exemption threshold in 2006-2010, years for which the exemption threshold varied only a little: it was 760K in 2006, 770K in 2008, and 790K in 2009 and 2010. Panel B shows the distribution of taxpayers around 1,300K, which in 2009 and 2010 represented a pure tax kink (discontinuity in marginal tax rates) as explored in Figure 2. Panel C layers on top of the distribution for 2010 from Panel B the distribution of taxpayers for the year 2011 when the 1,300K threshold becomes the exemption threshold. Therefore, this threshold becomes associated both with a change in wealth tax rates and a change in reporting requirements
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