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Quality of Proxy Advice: Evidence from Say-on-Pay Recommendations

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4613727
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40/40 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

27 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 40 checked references that resolve
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Shareholder Votes and Proxy Advisors: Evidence from Say on Pay
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Distracted directors: Does board busyness hurt shareholder value?
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Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the UK
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Information Intermediary or De Facto Standard Setter? Field Evidence on the Indirect and Direct Influence of Proxy Advisors
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Time‐Varying Fund Manager Skill
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resolves10.1086/682910
Outsourcing Shareholder Voting to Proxy Advisory Firms
resolves10.1287/mnsc.2016.2652
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Measuring Readability in Financial Disclosures
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resolves10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.04.002
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Determinants and consequences of executive compensation-related shareholder activism and say-on-pay votes: A literature review and research agenda
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The Importance of Shareholder Activism: The Case of Say‐on‐Pay
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no DOI — not checkedA theory of one-size-fits-all recommendations
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