Reference health
Climate Policies Under Income Inequality
73/73 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27
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The 73 checked references that resolve
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Combined inequality in wealth and risk leads to disaster in the climate change game
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The impact of endowment heterogeneity and origin on public good contributions: evidence from the lab
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Revisiting the redistribution hypothesis with perceived inequality and redistributive preferences
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The voluntary contributions mechanism with uncertain group payoffs
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New Trends in Measuring Environmental Attitudes: Measuring Endorsement of the New Ecological Paradigm: A Revised NEP Scale
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Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods Experiments
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Social Comparisons and Pro-social Behavior: Testing “Conditional Cooperation” in a Field Experiment
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The role of risk preferences and loss aversion in farmers’ energy-efficient appliance use behavior
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Income inequality and the environment: aggregation bias in environmental Kuznets curves
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INCOME INEQUALITY, RECIPROCITY AND PUBLIC GOOD PROVISION: AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
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COMMUNICATION and FREE‐RIDING BEHAVIOR: THE VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION MECHANISM
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IS INEQUALITY HARMFUL FOR THE ENVIRONMENT IN A GROWING ECONOMY?
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Monetary and Nonmonetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism
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The Role of Non-Binding Pledges in Social Dilemmas with Mitigation and Adaptation
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Cooperative interaction of rich and poor can be catalyzed by intermediate climate targets
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The private provision of a public good is independent of the distribution of income
The 47 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
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no DOI — not checkedThe Voluntary Provision of Public Goods under Varying Income Distributions
no DOI — not checkedExternal validity of economic experiments on Agri-environmental scheme design
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no DOI — not checkedInformation disclosure under liability: an experiment on public bads
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no DOI — not checkedGoverning the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action
no DOI — not checkedThe psychology of construal in the design of field experiments
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