Reference health
A (mathematical) definition of algorithmic collusion [OLD VERSION]
36/36 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
40 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 36 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1287/mnsc.2020.3680
Personalized Dynamic Pricing with Machine Learning: High-Dimensional Features and Heterogeneous Elasticity
resolves10.1287/opre.1080.0640
Dynamic Pricing Without Knowing the Demand Function: Risk Bounds and Near-Optimal Algorithms
resolves10.1287/mnsc.2014.2031
On the (Surprising) Sufficiency of Linear Models for Dynamic Pricing with Demand Learning
resolves10.1287/opre.2020.1993
Technical Note—Data-Based Dynamic Pricing and Inventory Control with Censored Demand and Limited Price Changes
resolves10.1287/moor.2020.1084
Nonparametric Learning Algorithms for Joint Pricing and Inventory Control with Lost Sales and Censored Demand
resolves10.1287/opre.2020.2078
Technical Note—Joint Learning and Optimization of Multi-Product Pricing with Finite Resource Capacity and Unknown Demand Parameters
resolves10.1287/opre.2019.1843
Technical Note—Nonstationary Stochastic Optimization Under <i>L</i><sub><i>p,q</i></sub>-Variation Measures
resolves10.1287/opre.2017.1629
Technical Note—Dynamic Pricing and Demand Learning with Limited Price Experimentation
resolves10.1287/opre.2014.1341
Learning and Pricing with Models That Do Not Explicitly Incorporate Competition
resolves10.1287/moor.2013.0636
Dynamic Pricing with Multiple Products and Partially Specified Demand Distribution
resolves10.1016/j.ejor.2015.06.059
Tracking the market: Dynamic pricing and learning in a changing environment
resolves10.1287/mnsc.2013.1788
Simultaneously Learning and Optimizing Using Controlled Variance Pricing
resolves10.1007/s10657-020-09662-6
AI algorithms, price discrimination and collusion: a technological, economic and legal perspective
resolves10.1287/mksc.2020.1276
Frontiers: Algorithmic Collusion: Supra-competitive Prices via Independent Algorithms
resolves10.1093/joclec/nhy016
DEVELOPING COMPETITION LAW FOR COLLUSION BY AUTONOMOUS ARTIFICIAL AGENTS†
resolves10.1287/mnsc.1110.1426
Bayesian Dynamic Pricing Policies: Learning and Earning Under a Binary Prior Distribution
resolves10.1287/opre.2014.1294
Dynamic Pricing with an Unknown Demand Model: Asymptotically Optimal Semi-Myopic Policies
resolves10.1111/1756-2171.12383
Autonomous algorithmic collusion: Q‐learning under sequential pricing
resolves10.1155/2022/4830491
Limiting Dynamics for Q‐Learning with Memory One in Symmetric Two‐Player, Two‐Action Games
resolves10.21684/2412-2343-2020-7-2-94-117
Price Algorithms as a Threat to Competition Under the Conditions of Digital Economy: Approaches to Antimonopoly Legislation of BRICS Countries
resolves10.1287/opre.2013.1245
Close the Gaps: A Learning-While-Doing Algorithm for Single-Product Revenue Management Problems
The 40 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref1
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no DOI — not checkedref4
no DOI — not checkedref8
no DOI — not checkedIntrinsic fluctuations of reinforcement learning promote cooperation
no DOI — not checkedStrategic choice of pricesetting algorithms
no DOI — not checkedAlgorithmic collusion in electronic markets: The impact of tick size
no DOI — not checkedThe algorithmic learning equations: Evolving strategies in dynamic games
no DOI — not checkedA folk theorem from learning in games
no DOI — not checkedref23
no DOI — not checkedLearning to optimize under non-stationarity
no DOI — not checkedref27
no DOI — not checkedref29
no DOI — not checkedref34
no DOI — not checkedOn algorithmic collusion and reward-punishment schemes
no DOI — not checkedref36
no DOI — not checkedSustainable and unchallenged algorithmic tacit collusion
no DOI — not checkedAlgorithms as illegal agreements
no DOI — not checkedLimiting algorithmic coordination
no DOI — not checkedLearning to price under competition for multinomial logit demand
no DOI — not checkedAlgorithmic collusion: Insights from deep learning
no DOI — not checkedref49
no DOI — not checkedAlgorithmic pricing agents and tacit collusion: A technological perspective
no DOI — not checkedPlatform design when sellers use pricing algorithms
no DOI — not checkedref52
no DOI — not checkedAlgorithmic collusion
no DOI — not checkedref57
no DOI — not checkedref58
no DOI — not checkedWeak acyclicity in games with unique best-responses and implications for algorithmic collusion
no DOI — not checkedref61
no DOI — not checkedLearning to collude in a pricing duopoly
no DOI — not checkedref63
no DOI — not checkedref65
no DOI — not checkedref66
no DOI — not checkedref68
no DOI — not checkedref69
no DOI — not checkedref72
no DOI — not checkedConditional value-at-risk: Optimization algorithms and applications
no DOI — not checkedref76
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