Reference health

Benefits of Collaboration on Capacity Investment and Allocation

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4640223
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35/35 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-28

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

15 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 35 checked references that resolve
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A General Framework for the Study of Decentralized Distribution Systems
resolves10.1287/opre.49.4.578.11229
Design for Postponement: A Comprehensive Characterization of Its Benefits Under Unknown Demand Distributions
resolves10.1016/j.ejor.2010.06.010
Optimal capacity for substitutable products under operational postponement
resolves10.1287/opre.1040.0138
Optimal Investment Strategies for Flexible Resources, Considering Pricing and Correlated Demands
resolves10.1287/mnsc.2015.2303
The Role of Brand Image and Product Characteristics on Firms’ Entry and OEM Decisions
resolves10.1287/opre.1090.0699
A Stochastic Programming Duality Approach to Inventory Centralization Games
resolves10.1287/opre.1040.0191
Resource Flexibility with Responsive Pricing
resolves10.1287/mnsc.1060.0574
Strategic Investments, Trading, and Pricing Under Forecast Updating
resolves10.1287/msom.2020.0896
Private Information and Dynamic Bargaining in Supply Chains: An Experimental Study
resolves10.1016/j.ejor.2010.06.025
Cooperative game theory and inventory management
resolves10.1287/opre.51.5.771.16749
A Three-Stage Model for a Decentralized Distribution System of Retailers
resolves10.1287/mnsc.2014.2006
Bargaining Ability and Competitive Advantage: Empirical Evidence from Medical Devices
resolves10.1287/mnsc.2017.2796
Capacity Sharing Between Competitors
resolves10.1002/nav.20301
Nash bargaining over allocations in inventory pooling contracts
resolves10.1287/mnsc.1120.1591
Revenue Sharing in Airline Alliances
resolves10.1080/07408170902736689
Quantity commitment, production and subcontracting with bargaining
resolves10.1111/j.1937-5956.2009.01001.x
Measuring the Impact of Increased Product Substitution on Pricing and Capacity Decisions Under Linear Demand Models
resolves10.1017/CBO9780511607950
Bargaining Theory with Applications
resolves10.1287/mnsc.1080.0880
A Bargaining Framework in Supply Chains: The Assembly Problem
resolves10.1016/j.ejor.2006.05.045
Game-theoretic analysis of cooperation among supply chain agents: Review and extensions
resolves10.2307/1907266
The Bargaining Problem
resolves10.1287/msom.1070.0164
Cooperation Between Multiple Newsvendors with Warehouses
resolves10.1287/mnsc.1040.0212
Sell the Plant? The Impact of Contract Manufacturing on Innovation, Capacity, and Profitability
resolves10.1111/poms.12348
Investing in a Shared Supplier in a Competitive Market: Stochastic Capacity Case
resolves10.1287/mnsc.2015.2358
Win-Win Capacity Allocation Contracts in Coproduction and Codistribution Alliances
resolves10.2307/1912531
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
resolves10.2307/2555525
Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly
resolves10.1016/j.ejor.2004.03.014
Cooperation between multiple news-vendors with transshipments
resolves10.1287/mnsc.44.8.1071
Investment Strategies for Flexible Resources
resolves10.1287/mnsc.45.7.954
Coordinating Investment, Production, and Subcontracting
resolves10.1287/msom.2013.0435
Horizontal Capacity Coordination for Risk Management and Flexibility: Pay Ex Ante or Commit a Fraction of Ex Post Demand?
resolves10.1287/mnsc.2019.3532
Multilocation Newsvendor Problem: Centralization and Inventory Pooling
resolves10.1016/j.ejor.2007.10.064
Conditions that cause risk pooling to increase inventory
resolves10.1111/poms.12322
Capacity Sharing and Cost Allocation among Independent Firms with Congestion
resolves10.1287/mksc.1100.0585
The Effects of Information Transparency on Suppliers, Manufacturers, and Consumers in Online Markets
The 15 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
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no DOI — not checkedref15
no DOI — not checkedRound two: Mazda plant with toyota a better fit than partnership with ford
no DOI — not checkedAchieving high individual service levels without safety stock? optimal rationing policy of pooled resources
no DOI — not checkedref23
no DOI — not checkedref24
no DOI — not checkedDynamic pricing of limited inventories when customers negotiate
no DOI — not checkedCollusion in bertrand vs. cournot competition: a virtual bargaining approach
no DOI — not checkedA two-stage linear production planning model with partial cooperation under stochastic demands
no DOI — not checkedIntroduction to experimental economics
no DOI — not checkedref42
no DOI — not checkedHow to manage alliances better than one at a time
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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