Reference health

Paying £1 or Nothing in Dictator Games: No Differences

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4723871
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37/37 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-03

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

5 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 37 checked references that resolve
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Paid and hypothetical time preferences are the same: lab, field and online evidence
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To pay or not to pay: Measuring risk preferences in lab and field
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Gender differences in altruism on Mechanical Turk: Expectations and actual behaviour
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The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework
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The effect of stakes in distribution experiments
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Experimental methods: Pay one or pay all
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Shall we pay all? An experimental test of Random Incentivized Systems
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Eliciting Individual Discount Rates
resolves10.1007/s00199-006-0153-z
Exploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness
resolves10.1007/s10683-011-9283-7
Dictator games: a meta study
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Cognitive Biases: Mistakes or Missing Stakes?
resolves10.1038/srep01213
Experimental subjects are not different
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Pay Enough or Don't Pay at All*
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On “lab rats”
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Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects
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The online laboratory: conducting experiments in a real labor market
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WITHIN‐SUBJECT COMPARISON OF REAL AND HYPOTHETICAL MONEY REWARDS IN DELAY DISCOUNTING
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What do Workplace Wellness Programs do? Evidence from the Illinois Workplace Wellness Study*
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Stake size effects in ultimatum game and dictator game offers: A meta-analysis
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Real and hypothetical rewards in self-control and social discounting
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Prolific.ac—A subject pool for online experiments
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Inside the Turk
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Anonymity and incentives: An investigation of techniques to reduce socially desirable responding in the Trust Game
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Effectiveness of random payment in Experiments: A meta-Analysis of dictator games
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Experimenter demand effects in economic experiments
The 5 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref11
no DOI — not checkedSecond-to-fourth digit ratio has a nonmonotonic impact on altruism
no DOI — not checkedref25
no DOI — not checkedLab vs online experiments: no differences
no DOI — not checkedref41
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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