Reference health

How Information Design Shapes Optimal Selling Mechanisms

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4753011
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17/17 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-28

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

6 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 17 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1016/j.infoecopol.2013.06.001
Price discrimination via information provision
resolves10.1257/0002828054201369
Long-Term Contracting with Markovian Consumers
resolves10.3982/TE2355
Optimal dynamic contracting: The first‐order approach and beyond
resolves10.1016/j.jet.2007.02.001
Information structures in optimal auctions
resolves10.1016/j.jet.2014.11.004
Sequential information disclosure in auctions
resolves10.1111/1467-937X.00150
Sequential Screening
resolves10.1111/j.1467-937X.2007.00442.x
Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
resolves10.1257/aer.101.6.2590
Bayesian Persuasion
resolves10.3982/ECTA13251
Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2015.03.003
Ex post information rents in sequential screening
resolves10.1093/restud/rdv003
Optimal Sales Contracts with Withdrawal Rights
resolves10.2307/2527055
Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination
resolves10.1257/aer.20151743
Discriminatory Information Disclosure
resolves10.1287/moor.6.1.58
Optimal Auction Design
resolves10.2307/1913154
Multistage Games with Communication
resolves10.3982/ECTA10269
Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach
resolves10.1016/j.econlet.2005.12.005
Mechanism design for arbitrary type spaces
The 6 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref4
no DOI — not checkedref9
no DOI — not checkedInformation disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design
no DOI — not checkedDisclosure and pricing of attributes
no DOI — not checked(reverse) price discrimination with information design
no DOI — not checkedPrivate disclosure with multiple agents
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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