Reference health

Investor Uncertainty and Voluntary Disclosure

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4761586
CiteStamped reference-health badge
52/52 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-03

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

10 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 52 checked references that resolve
resolves10.2307/2490657
Corporate Managers' Earnings Forecasts and Symmetrical Adjustments of Market Expectations
resolves10.1111/j.1475-679x.2005.00174.x
The Association between Outside Directors, Institutional Investors and the Properties of Management Earnings Forecasts
resolves10.2308/accr-10126
Cover Me: Managers' Responses to Changes in Analyst Coverage in the Post-Regulation FD Period
resolves10.1111/jofi.12180
Shaping Liquidity: On the Causal Effects of Voluntary Disclosure
resolves10.1016/S0165-4101(00)00012-4
The effect of international institutional factors on properties of accounting earnings
resolves10.1111/1475-679X.00001
Analyst Coverage and Intangible Assets
resolves10.1016/S0165-4101(97)00014-1
The conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings1
resolves10.2307/2490070
The Information Content of Annual Earnings Announcements
resolves10.1016/j.jacceco.2019.101244
Increased market response to earnings announcements in the 21st century: An Empirical Investigation
resolves10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.10.003
The financial reporting environment: Review of the recent literature
resolves10.2308/accr.2004.79.4.921
Voluntary Disclosure in a Multi-Audience Setting: An Empirical Investigation
resolves10.1016/j.jacceco.2015.07.008
On guidance and volatility
resolves10.1111/1475-679X.12482
How Do Firms Respond to Political Uncertainty? Evidence from U.S. Gubernatorial Elections
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01006.x
Model Uncertainty and Option Markets with Heterogeneous Beliefs
resolves10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.10.006
Is silence golden? An empirical analysis of firms that stop giving quarterly earnings guidance
resolves10.2308/tar-2017-0129
Information Externalities and Voluntary Disclosure: Evidence from a Major Customer's Earnings Announcement
resolves10.1177/0312896214529441
Voluntary disclosure and the cost of capital
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2022.08.004
Count (and count-like) data in finance
resolves10.2307/2491359
Management Forecasts and Information Asymmetry: An Examination of Bid-Ask Spreads
resolves10.1017/S0022109000002416
How Do Analyst Recommendations Respond to Major News?
resolves10.2307/2490910
Disclosure of Nonproprietary Information
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00672.x
Information and the Cost of Capital
resolves10.1111/1911-3846.12584
Endogeneity and the Dynamics of Voluntary Disclosure Quality: Is there Really an Effect on the Cost of Equity Capital?*
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb04636.x
Efficient Capital Markets: II
resolves10.1016/j.jacceco.2017.08.003
Identification and generalizability in accounting research: A discussion of Christensen, Floyd, Liu, and Maffett (2017)
resolves10.1016/j.jacceco.2016.09.001
Guiding through the Fog: Financial statement complexity and voluntary disclosure
resolves10.1111/1475-679X.12338
Do Risk Disclosures Matter When It Counts? Evidence from the Swiss Franc Shock
resolves10.1093/restud/rdad080
Sources and Transmission of Country Risk
resolves10.1007/s11142-017-9414-2
A theory of risk disclosure
resolves10.1007/s11142-022-09698-w
Is silence golden sometimes? Management guidance withdrawals during the COVID-19 pandemic
resolves10.1111/j.1475-679X.2012.00461.x
Do Managers Always Know Better? The Relative Accuracy of Management and Analyst Forecasts
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.06.006
Information Shocks and Short-Term Market Underreaction
resolves10.2308/accr.2003.78.2.449
Discretionary Risk Disclosures
resolves10.2307/2491118
Disclosure When the Market Is Unsure of Information Endowment of Managers
resolves10.2308/accr.2009.84.5.1575
Management Forecasts in Japan: An Empirical Study of Forecasts that Are Effectively Mandated
resolves10.1007/s11142-021-09652-2
Uncertainty about managerial horizon and voluntary disclosure
resolves10.2307/2491051
Trading Volume and Price Reactions to Public Announcements
resolves10.1111/j.1475-679X.2007.00238.x
Accounting Information, Disclosure, and the Cost of Capital
resolves10.1016/j.jacceco.2011.07.001
Transparency and liquidity uncertainty in crisis periods
resolves10.1111/1475-679X.00112
IAS Versus U.S. GAAP: Information Asymmetry–Based Evidence from Germany's New Market
resolves10.1057/s41267-018-0190-4
Country-level institutions and management earnings forecasts
resolves10.2308/accr-51296
Mandatory Financial Reporting and Voluntary Disclosure: The Effect of Mandatory IFRS Adoption on Management Forecasts
resolves10.1016/j.jacceco.2018.08.011
The effect of economic policy uncertainty on investor information asymmetry and management disclosures
resolves10.2307/2491336
Unobservable Precision Choices in Financial Reporting
resolves10.2308/accr-50189
Voluntary Disclosure Incentives and Earnings Informativeness
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.06.011
Stock returns after major price shocks: The impact of information
resolves10.2307/2491386
Why Firms Voluntarily Disclose Bad News
resolves10.1007/s11142-011-9165-4
The effect of stock price on discretionary disclosure
resolves10.1111/1475-679X.12413
Measuring Risk Information
resolves10.1016/0165-4101(90)90021-U
Information quality and discretionary disclosure
resolves10.1016/S0165-4101(01)00025-8
Essays on disclosure
resolves10.2307/2490919
Earnings Volatility and Voluntary Management Forecast Disclosure
The 10 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref1
no DOI — not checkedref5
no DOI — not checkedUnexpected earnings, firm size, and trading volume around quarterly earnings announcements
no DOI — not checkedUsing analysts' forecasts to measure properties of analysts' information environment
no DOI — not checkedBroad-versus narrow-sample evidence in disclosure regulation studies: A discussion of
no DOI — not checkedref42
no DOI — not checkedCorporate disclosure policy and analyst behavior
no DOI — not checkedref48
no DOI — not checkedref54
no DOI — not checkedref61
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

checked 2026-08-03 — re-checked daily as this page is visited; titles and statuses come from Crossref and DataCite and are not part of the signed record

Embed this badge

Both snippets point at the live badge image and link back to this page. The badge re-renders from the daily check, so an embed never goes stale by more than a day of visits.

<a href="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.4761586"><img src="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.4761586/badge.svg" alt="CiteStamped reference-health badge" width="460" height="64"></a>
[![CiteStamped reference-health badge](https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.4761586/badge.svg)](https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.4761586)