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Dynamic Collective Action and the Power of Large Numbers

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4833953
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Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

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The 12 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedWhy are Stabilizations Delayed?
no DOI — not checkedThe Dynamic Free Rider Problem: A Laboratory Study
no DOI — not checkedOrganizing for Collective Action: Olson Revisited
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no DOI — not checkedParticipation inequality and the 90-9-1 principle in open source
no DOI — not checkedThe n-Person War of Attrition
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no DOI — not checkedTesting Game-theoretic Models of Free Riding: New Evidence on Probability Bias and Learning
no DOI — not checkedNeural computations underlying strategic social decision-making in groups
no DOI — not checkedUsing a symmetric game based on volunteer's dilemma to improve VANETs multihop broadcast communication
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