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Sorting Through Cheap Talk: Theory and Evidence from a Labor Market

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4875540
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41/41 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

19 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 41 checked references that resolve
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Holdups and Efficiency with Search Frictions
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Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange
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Directed search in the housing market
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An Empirical Model of Wage Dispersion with Sorting
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The Winner's Curse, Reserve Prices, and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions
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Providing Advice to Jobseekers at Low Cost: An Experimental Study on Online Advice
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Pricing and Matching with Frictions
resolves10.1162/003355397555244
Labor Supply of New York City Cabdrivers: One Day at a Time
resolves10.2307/1913390
Strategic Information Transmission
resolves10.3982/ECTA7953
Sorting and Decentralized Price Competition
resolves10.1093/restud/rdq034
Identifying Sorting--In Theory
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How Large are Search Frictions?
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When 3 + 1 > 4: Gift Structure and Reciprocity in the Field
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00707.x
Putting Behavioral Economics to Work: Testing for Gift Exchange in Labor Markets Using Field Experiments
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Field Experiments
resolves10.1111/j.1467-937X.2008.00517.x
The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals
resolves10.1086/689213
The Effects of Algorithmic Labor Market Recommendations: Evidence from a Field Experiment
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The Effect of Information on Product Quality: Evidence from Restaurant Hygiene Grade Cards
resolves10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00186.x
Endogenous market segmentation for lemons
resolves10.3982/ECTA12103
Efficient Competition Through Cheap Talk: The Case of Competing Auctions
resolves10.1111/ecoj.12119
Is Internet Job Search Still Ineffective?
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Harmful signaling in matching markets
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Asymmetric Information, Adverse Selection and Online Disclosure: The Case of eBay Motors
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Opening the Black Box of the Matching Function: the Power of Words
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Inefficient Hiring in Entry-Level Labor Markets
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A Directed Search Model of Inequality with Heterogeneous Skills and Skill?Biased Technology
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The Assignment of Workers to Jobs in an Economy with Coordination Frictions
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Assortative Matching and Search
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The 19 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedThe Dual US Labor Market Uncovered
no DOI — not checkedHow do employers use compensation history? Evidence from a field experiment
no DOI — not checkedref9
no DOI — not checkedWhy marketplace experimentation is harder than it seems: The role of test-control interference
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no DOI — not checkedPreference signaling in matching markets
no DOI — not checkedref16
no DOI — not checkedThe geography of consumption inequality
no DOI — not checkedref20
no DOI — not checkedThe more you know: Information effects on job application rates in a large field experiment
no DOI — not checkedThe alpha beta gamma of the labor market
no DOI — not checkedThe unemployed with jobs and without jobs
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no DOI — not checkedBuyer uncertainty about seller capacity: Causes, consequences, and a partial solution
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no DOI — not checkedReviews, reputation, and revenue: The case of Yelp. com
no DOI — not checkedEx Ante Price Offers in Matching Games Non-Steady States
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