Reference health

Price Coordination with Asymmetric Information Sharing: Theory and Evidence *

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4923791
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37/37 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

34 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 37 checked references that resolve
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A computational framework for analyzing dynamic auctions: The market impact of information sharing
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Algorithmic Pricing and Competition: Empirical Evidence from the German Retail Gasoline Market
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New Evidence on Asymmetric Gasoline Price Responses
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The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction
resolves10.1257/aer.20170116
Learning to Coordinate: A Study in Retail Gasoline
resolves10.1086/734872
Asymmetric Information Sharing in Oligopoly: A Natural Experiment in Retail Gasoline
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How do Consumers Respond to Gasoline Price Cycles?
resolves10.2307/2951491
Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
resolves10.2307/2109643
Gas Wars: Retail Gasoline Price Fluctuations
resolves10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.023
Edgeworth cycles with partial price commitment
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Gasoline Price Cycles Under Discrete Time Pricing
resolves10.1016/S0167-7187(02)00038-3
Retail price cycles and the presence of small firms
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Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
resolves10.1111/sjoe.12024
Vertical Control and Price Cycles in Gasoline Retailing
resolves10.1016/0040-5809(90)90011-J
Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics∗
resolves10.2307/2296617
A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
resolves10.2307/1911462
Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
resolves10.1257/aer.101.6.2425
Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining Recent Collusive Practices
resolves10.1257/aer.102.5.2147
Spatial Differentiation and Vertical Mergers in Retail Markets for Gasoline
resolves10.1016/S0573-8555(06)82008-0
Chapter 8 The Economics of Tacit Collusion: Implications for Merger Control
resolves10.2307/2951777
Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
resolves10.1006/jeth.1995.1014
Evolution of Equilibria in the Long Run: A General Theory and Applications
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Bandwagon Effects and Long Run Technology Choice
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What Do a Million Observations on Banks Say About the Transmission of Monetary Policy?
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The Speed of Gasoline Price Response in Markets with and without Edgeworth Cycles
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Price leadership and coordination in retail gasoline markets with price cycles
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On the Relationship between Risk-Dominance and Stochastic Stability
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A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles
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Oligopolistic Price Leadership and Mergers: The United States Beer Industry
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Edgeworth Price Cycles, Cost-Based Pricing, and Sticky Pricing in Retail Gasoline Markets
resolves10.1111/j.1467-6451.2007.00303.x
EDGEWORTH PRICE CYCLES: EVIDENCE FROM THE TORONTO RETAIL GASOLINE MARKET<sup>*</sup>
resolves10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00078.x
Do retail gasoline prices respond asymmetrically to cost shocks? The influence of Edgeworth Cycles
resolves10.2307/2297153
On the Diffusion of New Technology: A Game Theoretic Approach
resolves10.1086/258853
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resolves10.1111/j.1467-8489.2009.00468.x
Station level gasoline demand in an Australian market with regular price cycles*
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The Evolution of Conventions
The 34 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref1
no DOI — not checkedref2
no DOI — not checkedACCC Takes Action Against Informed Sources and Petrol Retailers for Price Information Sharing
no DOI — not checkedACCC and Coles Express Resolve Petrol Price Information Sharing Proceedings
no DOI — not checkedPetrol Price Information Sharing Proceedings Resolved
no DOI — not checkedref8
no DOI — not checkedRapid Price Communication and Coordination: The Airline Tariff Publishing Case
no DOI — not checkedCompetition in Pricing Algorithms
no DOI — not checkedAre Online Prices Higher Because of Pricing Algorithms
no DOI — not checkedInformed Sources and the Role of Platforms for Facilitating Anticompetitive Communication
no DOI — not checkedref17
no DOI — not checkedEquilibrium Selection in Stag Hunt Games
no DOI — not checkedCollusion with Asymmetric Retailers: Evidence from a Gasoline Price-Fixing Case
no DOI — not checkedref23
no DOI — not checkedRetail Gasoline Price Cycles Across Spatially Dispersed Gasoline Stations
no DOI — not checkedref28
no DOI — not checkedref30
no DOI — not checkedGuidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to Horizontal Co-operation Agreements
no DOI — not checkedref35
no DOI — not checkedref38
no DOI — not checkedref45
no DOI — not checkedInformation Exchanges Among Firms and Their Impact on Competition
no DOI — not checkedWho Benefits from Information Disclosure? The Case of Retail Gasoline
no DOI — not checkedref50
no DOI — not checkedref53
no DOI — not checkedWhen Does Mandatory Price Disclosure Lower Prices? Evidence from the German Fuel Market
no DOI — not checkedGlobal Games: Theory and Applications
no DOI — not checkedref57
no DOI — not checkedEdgeworth Price Cycles and Focal Prices: Computational dynamic Markov Equilibria
no DOI — not checkedInformation Exchanges Between Competitors under Competition Law
no DOI — not checkedref64
no DOI — not checkedref66
no DOI — not checkedInformation Exchange: Be Reasonable
no DOI — not checkedref68
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