Reference health
Individual Preferences for Truth-Telling
89/89 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-29
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
36 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 89 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1093/restud/rds049
What Drives Taxi Drivers? A Field Experiment on Fraud in a Market for Credence Goods
resolves10.1016/j.jebo.2013.03.019
Sloppy work, lies and theft: A novel experimental design to study counterproductive behaviour
resolves10.1093/restud/rdac037
Economic and Social Outsiders but Political Insiders: Sweden’s Populist Radical Right
resolves10.1038/s41562-018-0399-z
Evaluating the replicability of social science experiments in Nature and Science between 2010 and 2015
resolves10.1017/S1930297500009220
Gender differences in lying in sender-receiver games: A meta-analysis
resolves10.1007/s11166-019-09299-0
Measuring ambiguity preferences: A new ambiguity preference survey module
resolves10.1016/j.jbef.2015.12.001
oTree—An open-source platform for laboratory, online, and field experiments
resolves10.1016/j.jdeveco.2015.07.008
Stability of experimental and survey measures of risk, time, and social preferences: A review and some new results
resolves10.1111/j.1542-4774.2011.01015.x
INDIVIDUAL RISK ATTITUDES: MEASUREMENT, DETERMINANTS, AND BEHAVIORAL CONSEQUENCES
resolves10.1257/aer.101.2.526
The Economics of Credence Goods: An Experiment on the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation, and Competition
resolves10.1287/mnsc.2022.4455
The Preference Survey Module: A Validated Instrument for Measuring Risk, Time, and Social Preferences
resolves10.1016/j.jebo.2020.07.028
Measuring preferences for competition with experimentally-validated survey questions
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2023.04.005
Morally questionable decisions by groups: Guilt sharing and its underlying motives
resolves10.1016/j.jebo.2013.08.007
Designing self-reporting regimes to encourage truth telling: An experimental study
resolves10.1073/pnas.0900152106
Patterns of neural activity associated with honest and dishonest moral decisions
resolves10.1016/j.joep.2017.07.008
Gender differences in honesty: The role of social value orientation
resolves10.1111/ecoj.12284
How Social Preferences Shape Incentives in (Experimental) Markets for Credence Goods
resolves10.1287/mnsc.2017.2800
I Lie? We Lie! Why? Experimental Evidence on a Dishonesty Shift in Groups
resolves10.1016/j.jebo.2014.07.012
Deception choice and self-selection – The importance of being earnest
resolves10.1111/jeea.12006
IDENTIFYING SOCIAL NORMS USING COORDINATION GAMES: WHY DOES DICTATOR GAME SHARING VARY?
resolves10.1007/s10797-014-9318-z
Tax evasion and social information: an experiment in Belgium, France, and the Netherlands
resolves10.1093/ej/uead056
Corrupted by Algorithms? How AI-generated and Human-written Advice Shape (Dis)honesty
resolves10.1093/jeea/jvaa009
The Long-Term Costs of Government Surveillance: Insights from Stasi Spying in East Germany
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00502.x
Neoclassical Theory Versus Prospect Theory: Evidence from the Marketplace
resolves10.1162/003355304772839524
The Nature and Extent of Discrimination in the Marketplace: Evidence from the Field
resolves10.1257/aer.20201333
Enabling or Limiting Cognitive Flexibility? Evidence of Demand for Moral Commitment
resolves10.1016/j.obhdp.2011.02.001
Justified ethicality: Observing desired counterfactuals modifies ethical perceptions and behavior
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02205.x
Deception Through Telling the Truth?! Experimental Evidence from Individuals and Teams
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2010.01.006
Paying for confidence: An experimental study of the demand for non-instrumental information
resolves10.1016/j.jrp.2017.11.012
Is the Dark Triad common factor distinct from low Honesty-Humility?
resolves10.1016/j.jrp.2009.04.011
The curiosity and exploration inventory-II: Development, factor structure, and psychometrics
The 36 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref1
no DOI — not checkedref2
no DOI — not checkedOur measure allows to relate gender and age separately to ILC and SIC 36 A more detailed analysis, including a figure analogous to Figure 4, is reported in appendix C.3. 37 WTP info is lower among participants who report zero tails than among those who report more than zero tails when the true outcome is zero (MWU, p<0.001)
no DOI — not checkedref4
no DOI — not checkedMalleability of preferences for honesty
no DOI — not checkedIndividual cheating in the lab: a new measure and external validity
no DOI — not checkedref10
no DOI — not checkedSustaining honesty in public service: The role of selection
no DOI — not checkedThe Influence of Self and Social Image Concerns on Lying
no DOI — not checkedObservability, Honesty, and the Social Image Costs of Lying
no DOI — not checkedCan Competitiveness Predict Education and Labor Market Outcomes? Evidence from Incentivized Choice and Survey Measures
no DOI — not checkedref33
no DOI — not checkedDishonesty and public employment
no DOI — not checkedThe Effect of Incentives in Nonroutine Analytical Team Tasks
no DOI — not checkedref56
no DOI — not checkedref64
no DOI — not checkedThe Truth About Lies: A Meta-Analysis on Dishonest Behavior
no DOI — not checkedCulture and gender differences in honesty
no DOI — not checkedDishonesty and selection into public service: Evidence from India
no DOI — not checkedDisguising lies -Image concerns and partial lying in cheating games
no DOI — not checkedWhy do oaths work? Image concerns and credibility in promise keeping
no DOI — not checkedref83
no DOI — not checkedThe behavioralist meets the market: Measuring social preferences and reputation effects in actual transactions
no DOI — not checkedSorting and wage premiums in immoral work
no DOI — not checkedReplications in economic psychology and behavioral economics
no DOI — not checkedAn exercise in selfreplication: Replicating
no DOI — not checkedref107
no DOI — not checkedref111
no DOI — not checkedref112
no DOI — not checkedEffectiveness of ex ante honesty oaths in reducing dishonesty depends on content
no DOI — not checkedref115
no DOI — not checked2021 student sample main experiment #70550
no DOI — not checkedref117
no DOI — not checkedref118
no DOI — not checkedref119
no DOI — not checkedcocor: A comprehensive solution for the statistical comparison of correlations
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this
work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none
carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings,
or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.
checked 2026-08-29 — re-checked daily as this page is visited; titles and statuses come from Crossref and DataCite and are not part of the signed record
Embed this badge
Both snippets point at the live badge image and link back to this page. The badge re-renders from the daily check, so an embed never goes stale by more than a day of visits.
<a href="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.5053604"><img src="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.5053604/badge.svg" alt="CiteStamped reference-health badge" width="460" height="64"></a>
[](https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.5053604)