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Inequality in the Age of Pseudonymity

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5380783
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68/68 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-24

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

75 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

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no DOI — not checkedInequalities in Open Source Software Development: Analysis of Contributor's Commits in Apache Software Foundation Projects
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no DOI — not checkedSubgroup Decomposition of the Gini Coefficient: A New Solution to an Old Problem
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no DOI — not checkedUnderstanding the inequality of web traffic and engagement in online healthcare communities
no DOI — not checkedWorst-case efficiency ratio in false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms
no DOI — not checkedIncentivising diffusion while preserving differential privacy
no DOI — not checkedThe Governance of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations: A Study of Contributors' Influence, Networks, and Shifts in Voting Power
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no DOI — not checkedDigital inequality and neighborhood divides in online social networks in Chicago
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