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Identification and Estimation in Many‐to‐One Two‐Sided Matching Without Transfers

https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta19636
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32/32 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-29

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

9 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 32 checked references that resolve
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School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach
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The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match
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An Empirical Model of the Medical Match
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Demand Analysis Using Strategic Reports: An Application to a School Choice Mechanism
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Demand Analysis under Latent Choice Constraints
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Stable Matching with Mistaken Agents
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What Happens when Separate and Unequal School Districts Merge?
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A Supply and Demand Framework for Two-Sided Matching Markets
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Connected Substitutes and Invertibility of Demand
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Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: The Boston Mechanism versus Its Alternatives
resolves10.3982/QE1139
Improved inference on the rank of a matrix
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The Econometrics of Matching Models
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A survey of preference estimation with unobserved choice set heterogeneity
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Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions
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Identification in matching games
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College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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Cupid’s Invisible Hand: Social Surplus and Identification in Matching Models
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Costly Concessions: An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility
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Preference Discovery in University Admissions: The Case for Dynamic Multioffer Mechanisms
resolves10.1086/722415
Partial Identification in Matching Models for the Marriage Market
resolves10.1093/ej/ueac038
Application Costs and Congestion in Matching Markets
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Identification and Estimation in Many‐to‐One Two‐Sided Matching Without Transfers
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Two-Sided Estimation of Mate Preferences for Similarities in Age, Education, and Religion
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Constructive identification in some nonseparable discrete choice models
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Large Matching Markets as Two-Sided Demand Systems
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Decentralized matching markets with(out) frictions: a laboratory experiment
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The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory
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Chapter 16 Two-sided matching
The 9 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedecta200680-bib-0006
no DOI — not checkedEderer, Tim (2022): “Two-Sided Matching Without Transfers: A Unifying Empirical Framework,” Working Paper, Toulouse School of Economics.
no DOI — not checkedecta200680-bib-0021
no DOI — not checkedGazmuri, Ana (2017): “School Segregation in the Presence of Student Sorting and Cream-Skimming,” Working paper, Toulouse School of Economics.
no DOI — not checkedHe, Yinghua (2017): “Gaming the Boston School Choice Mechanism in Beijing,” Working Paper, Rice University and Toulouse School of Economics.
no DOI — not checkedMenzel, Konrad (2022): “Strategic Network Formation With Many Agents,” Working Paper, NYU.
no DOI — not checkedMinistry of Education of Chile (n.d.): “Base de Datos de la Agencia de Calidad de la Educación,” Santiago, Chile.
no DOI — not checkedBayesian Statistics and Marketing
no DOI — not checkedSinha, Shruti (2015): “Identification and Estimation in One-to-One Matching Models With Nonparametric Unobservables,” Working Paper, Toulouse School of Economics.
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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