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Avoiding the curse of dimensionality in dynamic stochastic games

https://doi.org/10.3982/qe153
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Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

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The 34 checked references that resolve
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On the role of demand and strategic uncertainty in capacity investment and disinvestment dynamics
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A User's Guide to Solving Dynamic Stochastic Games Using the Homotopy Method
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no DOI — not checkedDoraszelski , U. K. Judd 2007 Dynamic stochastic games with sequential state-to-state transitions
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no DOI — not checkedEscobar , J. 2008 Existence of pure and behavior strategy stationary Markov equilibrium in dynamic stochastic games
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