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Demand heterogeneity in insurance markets: Implications for equity and efficiency

https://doi.org/10.3982/qe794
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30/30 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-22

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

6 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 30 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1257/aer.101.4.1180
Choice Inconsistencies among the Elderly: Evidence from Plan Choice in the Medicare Part D Program
resolves10.2307/1879431
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
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Mostly Harmless Econometrics
resolves10.1257/aer.104.10.3335
How Does Risk Selection Respond to Risk Adjustment? New Evidence from the Medicare Advantage Program
resolves10.1257/aer.102.7.3214
Pricing and Welfare in Health Plan Choice
resolves10.1086/262111
Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets
resolves10.1257/aer.97.3.745
Estimating Risk Preferences from Deductible Choice
resolves10.1257/aer.98.2.157
Preference Heterogeneity and Insurance Markets: Explaining a Puzzle of Insurance
resolves10.1162/003355398555649
Paying for Health Insurance: The Trade-Off between Competition and Adverse Selection
resolves10.1162/qjec.2010.125.3.877
Estimating Welfare in Insurance Markets Using Variation in Prices <sup>*</sup>
resolves10.1146/annurev.economics.050708.143254
Beyond Testing: Empirical Models of Insurance Markets
resolves10.1257/jep.25.1.115
Selection in Insurance Markets: Theory and Empirics in Pictures
resolves10.1257/aer.103.1.178
Selection on Moral Hazard in Health Insurance
resolves10.1162/REST_a_00514
Pricing Regulation and Imperfect Competition on the Massachusetts Health Insurance Exchange
resolves10.1086/587623
Sources of Advantageous Selection: Evidence from the Medigap Insurance Market
resolves10.1016/S0167-6296(00)00051-5
Risk segmentation: goal or problem?
resolves10.1257/aer.96.4.938
Multiple Dimensions of Private Information: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market
resolves10.1086/379936
Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: Policyholder Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.12.006
Redistribution by insurance market regulation: Analyzing a ban on gender-based retirement annuities
resolves10.1257/aer.90.4.1055
Optimal Risk Adjustment in Markets with Adverse Selection: An Application to Managed Care
resolves10.1016/j.jhealeco.2011.05.018
Gold and Silver health plans: Accommodating demand heterogeneity in managed competition
resolves10.1257/aer.20130758
Adverse Selection and an Individual Mandate: When Theory Meets Practice
resolves10.3982/ECTA12480
Equilibria in Health Exchanges: Adverse Selection versus Reclassification Risk
resolves10.1257/aer.103.7.2643
Adverse Selection and Inertia in Health Insurance Markets: When Nudging Hurts
resolves10.3386/w21759
Information Frictions and Adverse Selection: Policy Interventions in Health Insurance Markets
resolves10.3386/w21531
Assessing Incentives for Adverse Selection in Health Plan Payment Systems
resolves10.2307/2696386
Information and the Market for Lemons
resolves10.1257/aer.20131408
Bankruptcy as Implicit Health Insurance
resolves10.2307/1885326
Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information
resolves10.1111/1756-2171.12048
Insurer pricing and consumer welfare: evidence from Medigap
The 6 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedHandbook of Health Economics
no DOI — not checkedCarlin , C. R. Town 2008 Adverse selection, welfare and optimal pricing of employer-sponsored health plans
no DOI — not checkedKaiser Family Foundation and the Health Research and Educational Trust 2007 Annual Survey of Employer Health Benefits, 2007
no DOI — not checkedLayton , T. 2014 Imperfect risk adjustment, risk preferences, and sorting in competitive health insurance markets
no DOI — not checkedHealth insurance and the demand for medical care: Evidence from a randomized experiment
no DOI — not checkedHandbook of Health Economics
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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