Reference health

Free riding and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange

https://doi.org/10.3982/te1357
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38/38 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-28

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

6 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 38 checked references that resolve
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Clearing algorithms for barter exchange markets
resolves10.1002/9780470277331
The Probabilistic Method
resolves10.3386/w18202
The Need for (long) Chains in Kidney Exchange
resolves10.1111/j.1600-6143.2011.03800.x
NEAD Chains in Transplantation
resolves10.1111/j.1600-6143.2011.03481.x
Nonsimultaneous Chains and Dominos in Kidney- Paired Donation—Revisited
resolves10.1257/aer.102.3.354
New Challenges in Multihospital Kidney Exchange
resolves10.1145/1807342.1807345
Auctions with online supply
resolves10.1142/S1793830909000373
MAXIMUM WEIGHT CYCLE PACKING IN DIRECTED GRAPHS, WITH APPLICATION TO KIDNEY EXCHANGE PROGRAMS
resolves10.1007/BF01584082
Matroids and the greedy algorithm
resolves10.1111/j.0741-6261.2007.00121.x
Unraveling yields inefficient matchings: evidence from post‐season college football bowls
resolves10.1002/9781118032718
Random Graphs
resolves10.1257/aer.99.3.608
Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets
resolves10.1093/qje/qjt019
Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets*
resolves10.1111/j.1600-6143.2010.03019.x
Kidneys for Sale: Who Disapproves, and Why?
resolves10.1111/ajt.12189
Center-Level Utilization of Kidney Paired Donation
resolves10.1257/0002828054201323
The Collapse of a Medical Labor Clearinghouse (and Why Such Failures Are Rare)
resolves10.1053/j.gastro.2005.10.058
What Will Be Needed for the New Gastroenterology Fellowship Match to Succeed?
resolves10.1053/j.gastro.2008.06.075
The Gastroenterology Fellowship Match—The First Two Years
resolves10.1086/378530
Unraveling Reduces Mobility in a Labor Market: Gastroenterology with and without a Centralized Match
resolves10.1257/000282805774669691
The Gastroenterology Fellowship Market: Should There Be a Match?
resolves10.1056/NEJMoa0803645
A Nonsimultaneous, Extended, Altruistic-Donor Chain
resolves10.1111/j.1600-6143.2012.04034.x
Call to Develop a Standard Acquisition Charge Model for Kidney Paired Donation
resolves10.1016/0165-1765(82)90003-9
Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
resolves10.1257/jep.21.3.37
Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02121.x
What Have We Learned from Market Design?
resolves10.1016/0304-4068(77)90004-0
Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
resolves10.1162/0033553041382157
Kidney Exchange
resolves10.1016/j.jet.2005.04.004
Pairwise kidney exchange
resolves10.1257/000282805774669989
A Kidney Exchange Clearinghouse in New England
resolves10.1257/aer.97.3.828
Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences
resolves10.1097/01.tp.0000195775.77081.25
Increasing the Opportunity of Live Kidney Donation by Matching for Two- and Three-Way Exchanges
resolves10.1016/0304-4068(74)90033-0
On cores and indivisibility
resolves10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570515.003.0005
Market Design for Kidney Exchange
resolves10.1016/j.jet.2014.04.003
Altruistically unbalanced kidney exchange
resolves10.1097/00007890-199801270-00030
PAIRED KIDNEY EXCHANGE IS NOT A SOLUTION TO ABO INCOMPATIBILITY
resolves10.1145/1993574.1993626
A random graph model of kidney exchanges
resolves10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00575.x
Dynamic Kidney Exchange
resolves10.1097/00007890-200108270-00015
PRIMUM NON NOCERE: AVOIDING HARM TO VULNERABLE WAIT LIST CANDIDATES IN AN INDIRECT KIDNEY EXCHANGE
The 6 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedStability in large matching markets with complementarities
no DOI — not checkedMix and match
no DOI — not checkedMarriage, honesty, and stability
no DOI — not checkedMoney and the Mechanism of Exchange
no DOI — not checkedRoth , Alvin E. 2010 The first kidney exchange in the U.S., and other accounts of early progress http://marketdesigner.blogspot.com/2010/04/first-kidney-exchange-in-us-and-other.html
no DOI — not checkedJumping the gun: Imperfections and institutions related to the timing of market transactions
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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