Reference health

A theory of school-choice lotteries

https://doi.org/10.3982/te1558
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2 of 32 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-28

At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.

7 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

References needing attention

does not resolve to a known work10.2307/2321753
does not resolve to a known work10.2307/2312726
The 30 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1257/aer.101.1.399
Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: The “Boston Mechanism” Reconsidered
resolves10.1257/000282805774669637
The Boston Public School Match
resolves10.3386/w11965
Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism
resolves10.1257/aer.99.5.1954
Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match
resolves10.1006/jeth.1999.2553
House Allocation with Existing Tenants
resolves10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00091-7
Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments
resolves10.1257/000282803322157061
School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach
resolves10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00096-6
Stable schedule matching under revealed preference
resolves10.1007/s00182-010-0251-9
House allocation with fractional endowments
resolves10.2139/ssrn.2237425
Strategy-Proofness in the Large
resolves10.1006/jeth.1998.2469
A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement
resolves10.1006/jeth.2000.2710
A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem
resolves10.3982/ECTA8354
Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
resolves10.3982/ECTA10011
The Revealed Preference Theory of Stable and Extremal Stable Matchings
resolves10.4153/CJM-1965-045-4
Paths, Trees, and Flowers
resolves10.1145/321694.321699
Theoretical Improvements in Algorithmic Efficiency for Network Flow Problems
resolves10.1257/aer.98.3.669
What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice
resolves10.3386/w14618
Ex Ante Efficiency in School Choice Mechanisms: An Experimental Investigation
resolves10.4153/CJM-1956-045-5
Maximal Flow Through a Network
resolves10.1086/260757
The Efficient Allocation of Individuals to Positions
resolves10.1016/j.jet.2005.05.001
A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain
resolves10.1162/qjec.2010.125.3.1297
School Choice with Consent <sup>*</sup>
resolves10.1016/j.jet.2009.09.002
Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
resolves10.1145/362619.362631
The stable marriage problem
resolves10.3982/TE816
Lotteries in student assignment: An equivalence result
resolves10.1287/moor.7.4.617
The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
resolves10.1287/moor.18.4.803
Stable Matchings, Optimal Assignments, and Linear Programming
resolves10.1287/moor.23.4.874
The Geometry of Fractional Stable Matchings and Its Applications
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2008.04.017
Random assignment under weak preferences
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2010.01.001
The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments
The 7 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedExpanding ‘choice’ in school choice
no DOI — not checkedEhlers , Lars Alexander Westkamp 2011 Strategy-proof tie-breaking
no DOI — not checkedErdil , Aytek Haluk Ergin 2007 Two-sided matching with indifferences
no DOI — not checkedErdil , Aytek Fuhito Kojima 2007 Notes on stability of fractional matchings
no DOI — not checkedManjunath , Vikram 2013 Stability and the core of probabilistic marriage problems
no DOI — not checkedManjunath , Vikram 2014 Markets for fractional partnerships
no DOI — not checkedContributions to the Theory of Games
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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