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Effects of grand coalition payoffs on coalition formation in three-person games

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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.3800120303openalex-snapshot

The kernel of a cooperative game

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2161-6_7openalex-snapshot

Test of the Bargaining Set and Kernel Models in Three-Person Games

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-1031(76)90056-1openalex-snapshot

When three is not always two against one: Coalitions in experimental three-person cooperative games

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/222544openalex-snapshot

Further Development of a Theory of Coalitions in the Triad

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400882014-022openalex-snapshot

21. The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1907817openalex-snapshot

Contributions to the Theory of Games

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1976085openalex-snapshot

Bargaining in a Three-Person Game

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2088718openalex-snapshot

A Theory of Coalitions in the Triad

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2089158openalex-snapshot

An Experimental Study of Coalitions in the Triad

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2090255openalex-snapshot

An Experimental Test of a Theory of Coalition Formation

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3320146openalex-snapshot

Two against One. Coalitions in Triads

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3758/bf03200307openalex-snapshot

Computer controlled research on bargaining and coalition formation

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3763568openalex-extracted

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1002/bs.3830220505openalex-snapshot

A competitive test of the 1(im)bargaining set, kernel, and equal share models

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1002/bs.3830220605openalex-snapshot

Recognition of coalition by computer in a three-person game

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1002/bs.3830240202openalex-snapshot

Coalition formation in triads with single-peaked payoff curves

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1002/bs.3830240405openalex-snapshot

Effects of core properties in four-person games with side-payments

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1002/bs.3830270205openalex-snapshot

Evaluating theoretical predictions in the social sciences: Coalition theories and other models

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2420110304openalex-snapshot

The equal division kernel: An equity approach to coalition formation and payoff distribution in N‐person games

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2420170102openalex-snapshot

Size of smallest coalition as a source of power in coalition bargaining

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1002/job.4030060104openalex-snapshot

The formation of blocs in an experimental study of coalition

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-5578-9_8openalex-snapshot

Coalition Formation: A Social Psychological Approach

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-5649-7_1openalex-snapshot

International Water Resource Conflicts: Experience and Potential

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48356-1_17openalex-snapshot

Order of Strength and Exhaustivity as Additional Hypotheses in Theories for 3-Person Characteristic Function Games

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-57458-0_3openalex-snapshot

Coalitions in Multilateral Negotiations

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60454-6_19openalex-snapshot

Descriptive Approaches to Cooperation

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-41501-6_5openalex-snapshot

Standards of Fairness in 4-Person Monopolistic Cooperative Games

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1992-1_11openalex-snapshot

Coalition Formation in the Triad When Two are Weak and One is Strong

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1992-1_12openalex-snapshot

The Power of a Coalition and Payoff Disbursement in Three-Person Negotiable Conflicts

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1992-1_14openalex-snapshot

Relative Gain Maximization in Sequential 3-Person Characteristic Function Games

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1992-1_15openalex-snapshot

Comparison of Theories for Payoff Disbursement of Coalition Values

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00125655openalex-snapshot

Comparison of theories for payoff disbursement of coalition values

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s12525-013-0128-4openalex-snapshot

The stability of cooperative sourcing coalitions ‐ game theoretical analysis and experiment

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/0001-6918(88)90049-2openalex-snapshot

New approaches in research on cooperative conflict resolution by group decisions

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/0022-1031(84)90016-7openalex-snapshot

Effects of alternatives in coalition bargaining

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/0022-2496(85)90012-4openalex-snapshot

Relative gain maximization in sequential 3-person characteristic function games

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(80)90003-7openalex-snapshot

Coalition formation in the triad when two are weak and one is strong

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(92)90086-qopenalex-snapshot

Payoff divisions on coalition formation in a three-person characteristic function experiment

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2022.102219openalex-snapshot

Strategic alliances in a veto game: An experimental study

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/s0065-2601(08)60145-8openalex-snapshot

Coalition Bargaining

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/s0166-4115(08)62268-2openalex-snapshot

References to Chapter 2

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/s0166-4115(08)62269-4openalex-snapshot

References to Chapter 3

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/s1574-0005(05)80021-9openalex-snapshot

Chapter 18 The bargaining set, kernel, and nucleolus

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/s1574-0005(05)80069-4openalex-snapshot

Chapter 37 Coalition structures

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.85.5.1130openalex-snapshot

Models of coalition behavior: Game theoretic, social psychological, and political perspectives.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/0022250x.1982.9989922openalex-snapshot

The power of a coalition and payoff disbursement in three‐person negotiable conflicts

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/tmi.2012.2202915openalex-snapshot

A Game-Theoretic Framework for Landmark-Based Image Segmentation

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1177/002200277802200108openalex-snapshot

Equilibrium Payoff Configurations for Cooperative Games with Transferability

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1177/002200277902300106openalex-snapshot

A Competitive Test of the M 1 (i) and M 1 (im) Bargaining Sets

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1177/0022002786030002007openalex-snapshot

Mollifier Representation in Non-Constant-Sum Games

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2130/jjesp.45.77openalex-snapshot

Some analogies in the processes of social consensus formation and grand coalition formation: implications for managing conflicts in their processes

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3758/bf03201765openalex-snapshot

A PDP-11/45 program for playing n-person characteristic function games

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