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Large Nonanonymous Repeated Games
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What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2373openalex-snapshot
When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2605openalex-snapshot
Pivotal Players and the Characterization of Influence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(80)90038-1openalex-snapshot
Noncooperative price taking in large dynamic markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90022-7openalex-snapshot
Pollution claim settlements under private information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90052-lopenalex-snapshot
Anonymous repeated games with a large number of players and random outcomes
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2298018openalex-snapshot
Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-28727-2_20openalex-snapshot
What Information Theory Says About Bounded Rational Best Response
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-32834-3_12openalex-snapshot
Information Theory ― The Bridge Connecting Bounded Rational Game Theory and Statistical Physics
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Theory of Collective Intelligence
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-016-0539-5openalex-snapshot
A link between sequential semi-anonymous nonatomic games and their large finite counterparts
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-020-00356-xopenalex-snapshot
Analysis of Markovian Competitive Situations Using Nonatomic Games
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2006.11.002openalex-snapshot
Anonymous markets and monetary trading
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2012.10.007openalex-snapshot
The essentiality of money in environments with centralized trade
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781009589888.018openalex-snapshot
Topics in Microeconomic Theory
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781009589888.020openalex-snapshot
Cooperation in Large Societies
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12487openalex-snapshot
TRADE ASSOCIATIONS: WHY NOT CARTELS?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00739.xopenalex-snapshot
Contagion Equilibria in a Monetary Model
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1937-5956.2012.01334.xopenalex-snapshot
A Nonatomic‐Game Approach to Dynamic Pricing under Competition
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/2976734openalex-snapshot
An Antifolk Theorem for Large Repeated Games
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-072720-042303openalex-snapshot
Large Games: Robustness and Stability
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20200068openalex-snapshot
A Few Bad Apples Spoil the Barrel: An Anti-Folk Theorem for Anonymous Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.3.979openalex-snapshot
Cooperation among Strangers under the Shadow of the Future
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1090.0413openalex-snapshot
Players' Effects Under Limited Independence
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1110.0523openalex-snapshot
A Note on the Number of α-Pivotal Players
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1000375openalex-snapshot
Cooperation Among Strangers: An Experiment with Indefinite Interaction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2541955openalex-snapshot
Contagion Equilibria in a Monetary Model
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.870482openalex-snapshot
Markov Perfect Industry Dynamics With Many Firms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.882042openalex-snapshot
A Re-Interpretation of the Concept of Nash Equilibrium Based on the Notion of Social Institutions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3103/s096709120905012xopenalex-snapshot
Smelting steel in electrofurnaces with increased hot-metal consumption
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-a-006329942openalex-snapshot
On the Number of alpha-Pivotal Players
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2019016openalex-snapshot
Discrete mean field games: Existence of equilibria and convergence
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3982/ecta20206openalex-snapshot
Monitoring versus Discounting in Repeated Games
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1402.2801openalex-snapshot
An Anti-Folk Theorem for Large Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
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