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International Competition and Investment in Abatement: Taxes Versus Standards

https://doi.org/10.1007/0-306-48021-2_5
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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeem.1996.0007openalex-snapshot
Incentives for Advanced Pollution Abatement Technology at the Industry Level: An Evaluation of Policy Alternatives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-46765-3openalex-snapshot
Conflicts and Cooperation in Managing Environmental Resources
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-46765-3_6openalex-snapshot
The Choice of Environmental Policy Instruments and Strategic International Trade
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00338239openalex-snapshot
International aspects of pollution control
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0095-0696(86)90014-8openalex-snapshot
Innovation in pollution control
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0095-0696(89)90019-3openalex-snapshot
Firm incentives to promote technological change in pollution control
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0095-0696(92)90035-uopenalex-snapshot
Firm incentives to promote technological change in pollution control: Reply
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0076-5392(08)x6169-7openalex-snapshot
Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511805127openalex-snapshot
Differential Games in Economics and Management Science
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/46.supplement_1.878openalex-snapshot
Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a042020openalex-snapshot
DIFFERENCE GAMES AND POLICY EVALUATION: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3003549openalex-snapshot
Strategic Commitment with R&D: The Symmetric Case

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1544611openalex-extracted
A Tale of Two Externalities: Environmental Policy and Market Structure
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10666-010-9221-7openalex-snapshot
Dynamic Games in the Economics and Management of Pollution
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-011-9170-3openalex-snapshot
When do firms support environmental agreements?
Editorial review for independent work. ICSAC — the Institute for Complexity Science and Advanced Computing — runs a structured editorial panel for researchers publishing outside journals, and publishes on CiteStamp rails. Submission is free and goes through ORCID: icsacinstitute.org/submit.