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Focal Points in Framed Games: Breaking the Symmetry
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What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-51112-7_2openalex-snapshot
Static Focal Points in Framed Strategic Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-51112-7_3openalex-snapshot
Weak Isomorphisms of Extensive Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-51112-7_4openalex-snapshot
Dynamic Focal Points in Framed Extensive Games
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
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On the Role of Non-Equilibrium Focal Points as Coordination Devices
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L'improvisation collective libre : de l'exigence de coordination à la recherche de points focaux. : cadre théorique. Analyses. Expérimentations.
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