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Notes on naive semantics

https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00302339
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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3546-9_6openalex-snapshot
Many-Valued Logic
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00258428openalex-snapshot
The logic of paradox
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bfb0079548openalex-snapshot
Non-extensional type-free theories of partial operations and classifications, I
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1038/131384b0openalex-snapshot
Almost Periodic Functions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/01445348108837023openalex-snapshot
On a three-valued logical calculus and its application to the analysis of the paradoxes of the classical extended functional calculus
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2024557openalex-snapshot
Presupposition, Implication, and Self-Reference
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2024634openalex-snapshot
Outline of a Theory of Truth
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2025598openalex-snapshot
Godel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2025724openalex-snapshot
Semantical Paradox
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2184846openalex-snapshot
The Semantic Paradoxes: A Diagnostic Investigation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2270581openalex-snapshot
Trial and error predicates and the solution to a problem of Mostowski
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4213/smopenalex-snapshot
Математический сборник

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Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

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Bibliography
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Semantical and Logical Paradox
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Truth
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More on ‘A Liar Paradox’
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A Liar Paradox
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How to Think About Meaning
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Self-Reference, Chaos, and Fuzzy Logic
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The Transfinite Action of 1 Tape Turing Machines
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Revision Forever!
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Theorem Proving for Constructive λ-Calculus
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A family of three-valued autoepistemic logics
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Model theoretic semantics for Demo
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Knowledge representation, exemplification, and the Gupta-Belnap theory of circular definitions
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Constructing a normal form for Property Theory
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Semiotics in Canada
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A Defense of Reformed Empiricism
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Paradoxes, Hypodoxes, and More
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Deconstructing Superintelligence: Identity, Self-Modification and Différance
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Discrete Transfinite Computation
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Feferman and the Truth
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Belief Flow in Assertion Networks
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Three Kinds of Semantics
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On the Type-Free Paracoherent Foundation of Mathematics with the Sedate Extension of Classical Logic by the Librationist Set Theory £, and Specifically on Why £Is Neither Inconsistent nor Contradictory nor Paraconsistent
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Truth and the Liar
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Paradoxes of Self-Reference
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Semantics and the Liar Paradox
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A Reconstruction of Russell’s Substitution Theory
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Introduction
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Self-Reference, Attitudes And Paradox
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3551-8_15openalex-snapshot
A Bibliography of Works on Reflexivity
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Unstable Solutions to the Liar Paradox
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Predicative Logics
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Church’s Theorem and Randomness
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2602-1_7openalex-snapshot
Truth Makers, Truth Predicates, and Truth Types
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9309-0_13openalex-snapshot
Negation, Denial and Language Change in Philosophical Logic
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0466-3_3openalex-snapshot
Semantics and the Liar Paradox
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0487-8_2openalex-snapshot
Proof-Theoretical Aspects of Self-Referential Truth
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1456-3_20openalex-snapshot
Die Logik der Unbestimmtheiten und Paradoxien
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Some Remarks on the Finite Theory of Revision
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00247954openalex-snapshot
Kripke and the logic of truth
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00249368openalex-snapshot
Truth and reflection
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00249666openalex-snapshot
Alternative revision theories of truth
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Ungroundedness in classical languages
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Die logik der unbestimmtheiten und paradoxien
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Some remarks on extending and interpreting theories with a partial predicate for truth
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00388919openalex-snapshot
Book reviews
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00453021openalex-snapshot
Four valued semantics and the Liar
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00453022openalex-snapshot
Paradox, truth and logic part I: Paradox and truth
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00499816openalex-snapshot
Semantics and supervenience
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00556635openalex-snapshot
Paradoxes of fulfillment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00632905openalex-snapshot
Semantics and property theory
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00649483openalex-snapshot
How truthlike can a predicate be? A negative result
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00974144openalex-snapshot
Belief representation in a deductivist type-free doxastic logic
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf01048483openalex-snapshot
Dynamic semantics and circular propositions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf01052781openalex-snapshot
Non-well-founded sets via revision rules
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bfb0018440openalex-snapshot
A first order logic of truth, knowledge and belief
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-022-00640-9openalex-snapshot
From Paradoxicality to Paradox
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A Disquotational Theory of Truth as Strong as Z 2 − $Z_{2}^{-}$
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Conditionals in Theories of Truth
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Some Notes on Truths and Comprehension
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Revision Without Revision Sequences: Self-Referential Truth
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-018-9477-yopenalex-snapshot
Limits in the Revision Theory
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Guest Editors’ Introduction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-018-9481-2openalex-snapshot
Revision Without Revision Sequences: Circular Definitions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-018-9482-1openalex-snapshot
Rethinking Revision
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Instability and Contraction
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Comparing More Revision and Fixed-Point Theories of Truth
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Designing Paradoxes: A Revision-theoretic Approach
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Absolute Generality and Revision Theory
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Symmetry Groups of Boolean Self-referential Systems
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The Rationale Behind Revision-Rule Semantics
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In what sense is the no-no paradox a paradox?
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Jump Liars and Jourdain’s Card via the Relativized T-scheme
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Cofinally Invariant Sequences and Revision
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Periodicity and Reflexivity in Revision Sequences
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-017-9715-2openalex-snapshot
Boolean Paradoxes and Revision Periods
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Herzberger’s Limit Rule with Labelled Sequent Calculus
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The Elimination of Direct Self-reference
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Two types of deflationism
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Variations on a Montagovian theme
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Self-referential propositions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1748-1openalex-snapshot
What paradoxes depend on
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04244-wopenalex-snapshot
Necessity predicate versus truth predicate from the perspective of paradox
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-08-050296-0.50021-8openalex-snapshot
References
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Partiality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-934613-04-0.50010-7openalex-snapshot
A First Order Theory of Planning, Knowledge, and Action
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-934613-04-0.50012-0openalex-snapshot
THE KNOWER'S PARADOX AND REPRESENTATIONAL THEORIES OF ATTITUDES
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/b978-044451541-4/50013-0openalex-snapshot
Truth and Paradox
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/b978-044481714-3/50015-1openalex-snapshot
Partiality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/s0049-237x(06)80050-9openalex-snapshot
Russellian propositions
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The Practical Logic of Cognitive Systems
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Bibliography
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Paradoxes, Self-Reference and Truth in the 20th Century
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A GRAPH-THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF THE SEMANTIC PARADOXES
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Transfinite machine models
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ULTIMATE TRUTHVIS-À-VISSTABLE TRUTH
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ON THE PROBABILISTIC CONVENTION T
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TRUTH, LOGICAL VALIDITY AND DETERMINATENESS: A COMMENTARY ON FIELD’SSAVING TRUTH FROM PARADOX
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NOTES ON ω -INCONSISTENT THEORIES OF TRUTH IN SECOND-ORDER LANGUAGES
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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON TRUTH HIERARCHIES
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AXIOMATIZING SEMANTIC THEORIES OF TRUTH?
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SUPERVALUATION ON TREES FOR KRIPKE’S THEORY OF TRUTH
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SOLOVAY-TYPE THEOREMS FOR CIRCULAR DEFINITIONS
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PROVING UNPROVABILITY
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A UNIFIED THEORY OF TRUTH AND PARADOX
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THE COPERNICAN MULTIVERSE OF SETS
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A GENUINELY UNTYPED EXPLANATION OF COMMON BELIEF AND KNOWLEDGE
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/s1755020326101178openalex-snapshot
KRIPKE’S FIXED POINTS AND LEITGEB’S SEMANTIC DEPENDENCE
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What the Liar Taught Achilles
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Truth and Reduction
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Communication across Viewpoints
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The Objective Conception of Context and Its Logic
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Editorial Introduction
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Set-Theoretic Absoluteness and the Revision Theory of Truth
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1023/a:1012770331158openalex-snapshot
Recent Truth Theories: A Case Study
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Possible-Worlds Semantics for Modal Notions Conceived as Predicates
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On Meaningfulness and Truth
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Truth and Generalized Quantification
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Logics of Truth and Maximality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197786918.001.0001openalex-snapshot
The Concept of Truth
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197786918.002.0004openalex-snapshot
Dedication
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197786918.002.0005openalex-snapshot
Epigraph
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Preface
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Introduction
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The Meaning of ‘True’
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197786918.003.0003openalex-snapshot
The Logic of Truth
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197786918.003.0004openalex-snapshot
Truth, Phenomena, and Reality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197786918.003.0005openalex-snapshot
Supplement on the Revision Theory
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263301.001.0001openalex-snapshot
In Contradiction
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Copyright Page
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Epigraph
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Preface of First Edition
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Preface of Second Edition
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263301.003.0001openalex-snapshot
Dialetheism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263301.003.0002openalex-snapshot
Semantic Paradoxes
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Set Theoretic Paradoxes
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263301.003.0004openalex-snapshot
Gödel's Theorem
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263301.003.0005openalex-snapshot
Truth and Falsity
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263301.003.0006openalex-snapshot
Dialetheic Semantics for Extensional Connectives
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263301.003.0007openalex-snapshot
Entailment
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Pragmatics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263301.003.0009openalex-snapshot
The Disjunctive Syllogism and Quasi-Validity
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263301.003.0010openalex-snapshot
Semantic Closure and the Philosophy of Language
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263301.003.0011openalex-snapshot
Set Theory and The Philosophy of Mathematics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263301.003.0012openalex-snapshot
The Metaphysics of Change I: The Instant of Change
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263301.003.0013openalex-snapshot
The Metaphysics of Change II: Motion
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263301.003.0014openalex-snapshot
Norms and the Philosophy of Law
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263301.003.0015openalex-snapshot
The Transconsistent
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263301.003.0016openalex-snapshot
The Metaphysics of Change III: Time
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263301.003.0017openalex-snapshot
Minimally InconsistentLP
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263301.003.0018openalex-snapshot
Inconsistent Arithmetic
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263301.003.0019openalex-snapshot
Paraconsistent Set Theory
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263301.003.0020openalex-snapshot
Autocommentary on the First Edition
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263301.003.0021openalex-snapshot
Comments on Some Critics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669608.001.0001openalex-snapshot
The Yablo Paradox: An Essay on Circularity
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Copyright Page
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Dedication
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Introduction: Why Should We Care?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669608.003.0002openalex-snapshot
Origins and Mathematics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669608.003.0003openalex-snapshot
The Yablo Paradox and Circularity
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669608.003.0004openalex-snapshot
Generalizing the Yablo Paradox
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669608.003.0005openalex-snapshot
The Curry Generalization
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/jigpal/11.2.247openalex-snapshot
Reasoning about Knowledge and Belief: A Syntactical Treatment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/jigpal/9.1.83openalex-snapshot
Theorem proving for untyped constructive -calculus: implementation and application
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/jigpal/jzad016openalex-snapshot
The fixed points of belief and knowledge
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/jigpal/jzt020openalex-snapshot
Tarski's theorem and liar-like paradoxes
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/logcom/11.1.25openalex-snapshot
Revision Sequences and Computers with an Infinite Amount of Time
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exaa022openalex-snapshot
Elementary cellular automata and self-referential paradoxes
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exab009openalex-snapshot
Solovay functions and paradoxes
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzp107openalex-snapshot
Supervaluations Debugged
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The Liar Paradox, Expressibility, Possible Languages
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199896042.003.0004openalex-snapshot
Gestalt Shifts in the Liar orWhy KT4M Is the Logic of Semantic Modalities
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/91.251925openalex-snapshot
Self-reference and chaos in fuzzy logic
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00070.xopenalex-snapshot
What Theories of Truth Should be Like (but Cannot be)
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.1991.tb00539.xopenalex-snapshot
Denotation and description in free logic*
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12388openalex-snapshot
‘True’ as Polysemous
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/1778765.1778863openalex-snapshot
Parametric reshaping of human bodies in images
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1215/00294527-1731407openalex-snapshot
A New Conditional for Naive Truth Theory
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.12775/llp.2012.016openalex-snapshot
Librationist closures of the paradoxes
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1305/ndjfl/1040511340openalex-snapshot
A System of Complete and Consistent Truth
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1305/ndjfl/1093635425openalex-snapshot
Logics of truth.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1305/ndjfl/1093635839openalex-snapshot
Type-free property theory, exemplification and Russell's paradox.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1305/ndjfl/1094061861openalex-snapshot
A revision-theoretic analysis of the arithmetical hierarchy.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1515/semi.2002.018openalex-snapshot
Dynamic semiotics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2178/bsl/1255526080openalex-snapshot
Games for Truth
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2178/jsl/1052669071openalex-snapshot
On revision operators
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2178/jsl/1305810756openalex-snapshot
Weak systems of determinacy and arithmetical quasi-inductive definitions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2307/1523021openalex-snapshot
Definition and Revision: A Response to McGee and Martin
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2307/2214130openalex-snapshot
Hop, Skip and Jump: The Agonistic Conception of Truth
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2307/2215637openalex-snapshot
Pattern and Chaos: New Images in the Semantics of Paradox
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2307/2274021openalex-snapshot
The truth is never simple
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2307/2274046openalex-snapshot
Meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic, Stanford, California, 1985
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2307/2274394openalex-snapshot
A theory of properties
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2307/2275205openalex-snapshot
Annual Meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic, Pittsburgh, 1991
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2307/2275206openalex-snapshot
Spring Meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic, San Francisco, 1991
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2307/2275927openalex-snapshot
A guide to truth predicates in the modern era
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2307/2586533openalex-snapshot
Property theory and the revision theory of definitions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2307/2687753openalex-snapshot
On Gupta-Belnap Revision Theories of Truth, Kripkean Fixed Points, and The Next Stable Set
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2307/420955openalex-snapshot
Construction of Truth Predicates: Approximation Versus Revision
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.25911/5d78dcbebe66copenalex-snapshot
The Liar Paradox: A Consistent and Semantically Closed Solution
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