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First-order modal theories

https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00370319
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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/10992.1573-0433openalex-snapshot
Journal of Philosophical Logic
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-0346-0145-0_16openalex-snapshot
Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7642-0openalex-snapshot
Model Theory for Modal Logic
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00245925openalex-snapshot
Model theory for modal logic part I?The De re/de dicto distinction
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00245931openalex-snapshot
Model theory for modal logic?part II the elimination of De re modality
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00262054openalex-snapshot
Properties, propositions and sets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022481200094512openalex-snapshot
On modal logic with propositional quantifiers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198243540.001.0001openalex-snapshot
Objects of Thought
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0149.1964.tb00868.xopenalex-snapshot
ACTA PHILOSOPHICA FENNICA
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.1970.tb00432.xopenalex-snapshot
Propositional quantifiers in modal logic1
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2267689openalex-snapshot
Some theorems on definability and decidability
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2267690openalex-snapshot
On reduction to a symmetric relation

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

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Proximity Spaces of Exact Sets
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29415-0_21openalex-snapshot
Propositional Potentialism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29415-0_24openalex-snapshot
‘The Whole Truth: An Internal Perspective’: Response to Krämer’s ‘The Whole Truth’
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2877-0_7openalex-snapshot
Realism and Descriptivism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-5223-2_4openalex-snapshot
Plantinga on the Reduction of Possibilist Discourse
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6259-0_1openalex-snapshot
Basic Modal Logic
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00157548openalex-snapshot
The problem of non-existents
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00293421openalex-snapshot
Model theory for modal logic?Part III existence and predication
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00401964openalex-snapshot
Against ontological reduction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00500112openalex-snapshot
First-order modal theories III — Facts
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf01050341openalex-snapshot
Property theory: The type-free approachv. the church approach
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf02429839openalex-snapshot
Modal logic and model theory
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-021-09646-0openalex-snapshot
Essence and Necessity
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-024-09755-6openalex-snapshot
Some Ways the Ways the World Could Have Been Can’t Be
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-7812-3openalex-snapshot
Strong And Weak Possibility
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02166-yopenalex-snapshot
What does nihilism tell us about modal logic?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1873-xopenalex-snapshot
Why pure mathematical truths are metaphysically necessary: a set-theoretic explanation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03879-5openalex-snapshot
Propositional contingentism and possible worlds
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04114-5openalex-snapshot
Structured propositions and a semantics for unrestricted impure logics of ground
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04840-4openalex-snapshot
Modality, truth and mere picture thinking
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781009177740openalex-snapshot
Propositional Quantifiers
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/s1755020315000325openalex-snapshot
PROPOSITIONAL CONTINGENTISM
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/s1755020317000028openalex-snapshot
LOGICS FOR PROPOSITIONAL CONTINGENTISM
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/s1755020317000119openalex-snapshot
STRONGLY MILLIAN SECOND-ORDER MODAL LOGICS
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1075/cilt.333.17reeopenalex-snapshot
When control can’t be a fact
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2310190openalex-snapshot
Serious Actualism and Nonexistence
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2024.2379894openalex-snapshot
Contingentism and fragile worlds
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0199278709.001.0001openalex-snapshot
Modality and tense : philosophical papers
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0199278709.001.0001.002.003openalex-snapshot
Copyright Page
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0199278709.001.0001.002.005openalex-snapshot
Origin of the Papers
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0199278709.002.0001openalex-snapshot
Preface
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0199278709.003.0001openalex-snapshot
Introduction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0199278709.003.0002openalex-snapshot
1 Reference, Essence, and Identity
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0199278709.003.0003openalex-snapshot
2 The Problem ofDe ReModality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0199278709.003.0004openalex-snapshot
3 Quine on Quantifying In
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0199278709.003.0005openalex-snapshot
4 Prior on the Construction of Possible Worlds and Instants
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0199278709.003.0006openalex-snapshot
5 Plantinga on the Reduction of Possibilist Discourse
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0199278709.003.0007openalex-snapshot
The Problem of Possibilia
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0199278709.003.0008openalex-snapshot
7 The Varieties of Necessity
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0199278709.003.0009openalex-snapshot
8 Tense and Reality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0199278709.003.0010openalex-snapshot
9 Necessity and Non‐Existence
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0199278709.003.0011openalex-snapshot
10 Review of Counterfactuals by David Lewis
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0199278709.003.0012openalex-snapshot
11 Review ofThe Nature of Necessityby Alvin Plantinga
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780199384655.013.330openalex-snapshot
Natural Language Ontology
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anae048openalex-snapshot
Two distinctions about world-relative truth
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198796299.003.0008openalex-snapshot
Essence and Necessity
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2011.00307.xopenalex-snapshot
VII-Plural Quantification and Modality
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Presentism and The Grounding Objection
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00673.xopenalex-snapshot
Linguistic Understanding and Knowledge
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00616.xopenalex-snapshot
On Possibly Nonexistent Propositions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12179openalex-snapshot
Against Fundamentality‐Based Metaphysics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12822openalex-snapshot
Ground and Grain
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/stul.12003openalex-snapshot
A Semantic Constraint on Tenseless Clausal Complementation*
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.17863/cam.15913openalex-snapshot
Essential properties: analysis and extension
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.23811/45.arg2017.moropenalex-snapshot
World-stories and maximality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.26686/ajl.v16i3.4158openalex-snapshot
Boulesic-Doxastic Logic
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-955-3-177openalex-snapshot
Processes Endure, Whereas Events Occur
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.5840/factaphil2000215openalex-snapshot
Perception as Openness to Facts
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