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Where do the natural numbers come from?
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What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/10992.1573-0433openalex-snapshot
Journal of Philosophical Logic
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00243390openalex-snapshot
Individual-actualism and three-valued modal logics, part 1: Model-theoretic semantics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00247714openalex-snapshot
On modal logics which enrich first-order S5
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00250614openalex-snapshot
Individual-actualism and three-valued modal logics, part 2: Natural-deduction formalizations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0168-0072(80)90001-9openalex-snapshot
Three-valued logics: An introduction, a comparison of various logical lexica, and some philosophical remarks
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0168-0072(88)90010-3openalex-snapshot
Cardinality logics, part I: inclusions between languages based on ‘ ’
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2026440openalex-snapshot
Logicism and the Ontological Commitments of Arithmetic
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2184550openalex-snapshot
The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2184838openalex-snapshot
Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2215561openalex-snapshot
Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2274570openalex-snapshot
Cardinality logics. Part II: Definability in languages based on ‘exactly’
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/414091openalex-snapshot
Frege : Philosophy of language. By Michael Dummett. 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981. Pp. xliii, 708.
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9779-1openalex-snapshot
Reference to numbers in natural language
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0486-1openalex-snapshot
Reply to critics of the analytic tradition in philosophy vol. 1 the founding giants
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/0168-0072(88)90010-3openalex-snapshot
Cardinality logics, part I: inclusions between languages based on ‘ ’
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.langsci.2003.09.003openalex-snapshot
Proper names, predicative uses: an essay on logical form
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/s1755020313000397openalex-snapshot
LOGICISM, INTERPRETABILITY, AND KNOWLEDGE OF ARITHMETIC
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/s1755020315000052openalex-snapshot
RELATIVE CATEGORICITY AND ABSTRACTION PRINCIPLES
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/s1755020320000349openalex-snapshot
THE POTENTIAL IN FREGE’S THEOREM
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1023/a:1004330128910openalex-snapshot
Natural Numbers and Natural Cardinals as Abstract Objects: A Partial Reconstruction of Frege"s Grundgesetze in Object Theory
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/54.1.103openalex-snapshot
Speaking with Shadows: A Study of Neo‐Logicism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzab060openalex-snapshot
Steps Towards a Minimalist Account of Numbers
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198835578.003.0001openalex-snapshot
Metaphysics and the Theory of Content
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198835578.003.0003openalex-snapshot
Time and Temporal Content
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198835578.003.0006openalex-snapshot
Ontology and Intelligibility
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195325928.003.0007openalex-snapshot
Logicism Reconsidered
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkr008openalex-snapshot
Logicism and the Problem of Infinity: The Number of Numbers
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkv031openalex-snapshot
A Generic Russellian Elimination of Abstract Objects: Fig. 1.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12272openalex-snapshot
Acquiring mathematical concepts: The viability of hypothesis testing
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-114-2-179openalex-snapshot
Number Determiners, Numbers, and Arithmetic
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-12453671openalex-snapshot
Could the Truths of Mathematics Have Been Different?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2008-003openalex-snapshot
On Specifying Truth-Conditions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.70675/2dad4f11z26e3z44faz90cfz108b2bde5f24openalex-snapshot
On Sober Platonism : new Perspectives in Mathematical Platonism Beyond Strong Ontological Assumptions
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