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Initial probabilities: A prerequisite for any valid induction
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Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-59110-5_18openalex-snapshot
Modelling Decision Making Uncertainty and Contextuality
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Die logischen Grundlagen des statistischen Schließens
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Koordination und Langzeitbetreuung bei Patienten in der Allgemeinpraxis
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1853-1_5openalex-snapshot
Rational Belief Change, Popper Functions and Counterfactuals
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2288-0_2openalex-snapshot
The True Subjective Probability Problem
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3390-9_9openalex-snapshot
Induction, Acceptance, and Rational Belief: A Selected Bibliography
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9799-1_14openalex-snapshot
A Selected Bibliography of Local Induction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1586-7_7openalex-snapshot
Subjectivism, Objectivism and Objectivity in Bruno de Finetti’s Bayesianism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00485309openalex-snapshot
Rational belief change, popper functions and counterfactuals
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00486115openalex-snapshot
Physical probability and Bayesian statistics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00486158openalex-snapshot
The significance of the ergodic decomposition of stationary measures for the interpretation of probability
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf01469055openalex-snapshot
�ber diagnostische und therapeutische Entscheidungen
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03107-6openalex-snapshot
Synthetic a priori judgments and Kant’s response to Hume on induction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/0167-4730(94)90013-2openalex-snapshot
A non-probabilistic concept of reliability
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-444-52936-7.50005-7openalex-snapshot
The Modern Epistemic Interpretations of Probability
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/s1355-0306(01)71879-5openalex-snapshot
De Finetti's subjectivism, the assessment of probabilities and the evaluation of evidence: a commentary for forensic scientists
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/696386openalex-snapshot
An Axiomatic Theory of Inductive Inference
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/45.2.477openalex-snapshot
Probabilistic Support, Probabilistic Induction and Bayesian Confirmation Theory
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.1987.tb01312.xopenalex-snapshot
A NOTE ON FRIEDMAN AND THE NEO‐BAYESIAN APPROACH
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