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Cryptographic protocols for Vickrey auctions
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What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1109/sfcs.1982.38openalex-snapshot
Protocols for secure computations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1109/sfcs.1982.88openalex-snapshot
Protocols for secure computations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1109/tit.1976.1055638openalex-snapshot
New directions in cryptography
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.xopenalex-snapshot
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/357980.358017openalex-snapshot
A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/359340.359342openalex-snapshot
A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1177/0951692889001004002openalex-snapshot
Computational Approaches to Bargaining and Choice
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.26.2.119openalex-snapshot
State of the Art—Auctions and Bidding Models: A Survey
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36504-4_7openalex-snapshot
Secure Vickrey Auctions without Threshold Trust
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-58131-6_56openalex-snapshot
Cryptographic protocols for auctions and bargaining
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-9277-4_1openalex-snapshot
Modeling Opportunities in Auctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09234-3_36openalex-snapshot
FAST: Fair Auctions via Secret Transactions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48806-1_27openalex-snapshot
Publicly Verifiable Auctions with Privacy
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-27809-2_16openalex-snapshot
Interleaving Cryptography and Mechanism Design
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-1372-4_14openalex-snapshot
The Nearly Perfect Auctioneer: Cryptographic Protocols for Auctions and Bidding
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf02831900openalex-snapshot
A new protocol for multi-item electronic auctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10207-006-0001-yopenalex-snapshot
How to obtain full privacy in auctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10660-008-9013-1openalex-snapshot
Protocol completion incentive problems in cryptographic Vickrey auctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2019.03.023openalex-snapshot
Comprehensive survey on privacy-preserving protocols for sealed-bid auctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.dss.2004.08.006openalex-snapshot
On cheating in sealed-bid auctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2015.08.012openalex-snapshot
Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jnca.2017.08.012openalex-snapshot
ERA: Towards privacy preservation and verifiability for online ad exchanges
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/s0927-0507(05)80100-8openalex-snapshot
Chapter 19 Models of auctions and competitive bidding
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/03155986.2001.11732449openalex-snapshot
Tales From A Nonstandard Career In Operations Research
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/glocom.2014.7417743openalex-snapshot
An Efficient, Privacy-Preserving, and Verifiable Online Auction Mechanism for Ad Exchanges
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/glocom.2015.7417743openalex-snapshot
An Efficient, Privacy-Preserving, and Verifiable Online Auction Mechanism for Ad Exchanges
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/1330332.1330338openalex-snapshot
On the Existence of Unconditionally Privacy-Preserving Auction Protocols
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/3391403.3399495openalex-snapshot
Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/3576915.3623182openalex-snapshot
Riggs: Decentralized Sealed-Bid Auctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/779928.779938openalex-snapshot
On cheating in sealed-bid auctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1287/inte.31.6.83.9637openalex-snapshot
An Elementary Introduction to Auctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1287/inte.31.7.83.9637openalex-snapshot
An Elementary Introduction to Auctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.40.3.364openalex-snapshot
Modeling Competitive Bidding: A Critical Essay
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.49.11.1485.20585openalex-snapshot
Combinatorial Auction Design
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1070.0384openalex-snapshot
Thirteen Reasons Why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Process Is Not Practical
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