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Time consistency, asymmetric information and monetary policy design: An overview
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What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01384465openalex-snapshot
In search for stability: An empirical appraisal of the demand for money in the G7 and EC countries
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0164-0704(90)90022-3openalex-snapshot
Lectures on macroeconomics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2231(93)90003-fopenalex-snapshot
Designing institutions for monetary stability
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0169-2070(92)90130-2openalex-snapshot
American economic review
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0176-2680(90)90042-hopenalex-snapshot
Dynamic policy games in economics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3932(83)90051-xopenalex-snapshot
Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3932(91)90006-aopenalex-snapshot
Optimal accommodation by strong policymakers under incomplete information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-444-87387-3.50019-0openalex-snapshot
Macroeconomic Policy Games with Incomplete Information: Some Extensions* *This paper was written while the author was Houblon-Norman Research Fellow at the Bank of England. The work reflects views solely of the author and not necessarily of the Bank. The paper has benefited from comments received…
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/260551openalex-snapshot
Long-Term Contracts, Rational Expectations, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/260580openalex-snapshot
Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/260845openalex-snapshot
Aggregate Dynamics and Staggered Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a041751openalex-snapshot
SIGNALLING IN A MODEL OF MONETARY POLICY WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION *
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1184/r1/6708353openalex-snapshot
The Credibility of Monetary Announcements
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.17016/ifdp.1984.249openalex-snapshot
Monetary Policy Games and the Role of Private Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.20955/r.68.5-17.himopenalex-snapshot
Central Bank Behavior and Credibility: Some Recent Theoretical Developments
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1885679openalex-snapshot
The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1912324openalex-snapshot
A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w5075openalex-snapshot
Two Fallacies Concerning Central Bank Independence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w5251openalex-snapshot
Optimal Inflation Targets, `Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4337/9781035334834openalex-snapshot
Institutions and Monetary Policy
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60180-4_2openalex-snapshot
Winners and Losers in the European Monetary Union
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s101010200058openalex-snapshot
On the negative social value of central banks' knowledge transparency
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0475.00022openalex-snapshot
News Management in Monetary Policy: When Central Banks Should Talk to the Government
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3790/schm.120.1.1openalex-snapshot
Overcoming the Inflationary Bias Through Institutional Changes - Experiences of Selected OECD Central Banks
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