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On representing ‘true-in-l’ in L

https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02379018
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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00652077openalex-snapshot
Sortal ranges for complex predicates
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2183569openalex-snapshot
On Grelling's Paradox
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2183621openalex-snapshot
Toward a Solution to the Liar Paradox

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

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Disquotation and Infinite Conjunctions
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Fixed-Point Posets in Theories of Truth
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Reference and Truth
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How to find an attractive solution to the liar paradox
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Unrestricted quantification and ranges of significance
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Editorial Introduction
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Paradoxicality in Kripke’s theory of truth
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Truth and Paradox
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Kripke on Truth
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Post-Tarskian Truth
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Editorial Introduction
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Recent Truth Theories: A Case Study
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Tarskian and Kripkean truth
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The Concept of Truth
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Dedication
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Epigraph
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Preface
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Introduction
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The Meaning of ‘True’
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The Logic of Truth
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Truth, Phenomena, and Reality
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Non-Classical Circular Definitions
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