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On competition and endogenous firm efficiency

https://doi.org/10.1007/pl00004210
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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1993.1028openalex-snapshot
Endogenous Firm Efficiency in a Cournot Principal-Agent Model
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0120openalex-snapshot
A Note on Endogenous Firm Efficiency in Cournot Models of Incomplete Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-18584-9_13openalex-snapshot
Corporate Governance and Market Structure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2526609openalex-snapshot
Comparative Statics for Oligopoly
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555404openalex-snapshot
Product-Market Competition and Managerial Slack

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1013619openalex-extracted
The Impact of Entry on Prices and Costs
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3073430openalex-extracted
Microfoundations for Performance, Competition and Econometric Implications
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1002/soej.12121openalex-snapshot
Impact of the Information Asymmetry Between Managers and Owners Under Oligopoly
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7003-9_4openalex-snapshot
Managerial Incentives and Principal-Agent Type Oligopoly: Shifting of the Tax Burden
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.intfin.2022.101576openalex-snapshot
A principal–agent approach for estimating firm efficiency: Revealing bank managerial behavior
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/00220380802663575openalex-snapshot
Product Market Competition and Productivity in the Indian Manufacturing Industry
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1090.1126openalex-snapshot
Discretionary Disclosure of Proprietary Information in a Multisegment Firm
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