On the public citation graph

All-pay auctions with risk-averse players

https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0034-5
0 signed · 81 inferred · view as graph

Inferred edges come from two machine sources: sweeps of open repository metadata (mostly SSRN and Zenodo), and a bulk OpenAlex citation snapshot. Every row below is labelled with the one it came from. Neither is a complete citation index — absence here is not evidence of absence.

Is this your work? Sign in with ORCID and put your name on the claims that are yours.
Claim with ORCID
Reference health. See whether every reference in this work resolves to a known work and none has been retracted — and get a dated CiteStamped badge you can embed.
See reference health

What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0747openalex-snapshot
k-Price Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.2208openalex-snapshot
An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-18058-5openalex-snapshot
New Developments in the Analysis of Market Structure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-18058-5_17openalex-snapshot
The Theory of Technological Competition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-3069-2openalex-snapshot
Advanced mathematical methods for scientists and engineers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-5055-3_2openalex-snapshot
Efficient Rent Seeking
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79182-9_30openalex-snapshot
Strategic Behavior in Contests
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_18openalex-snapshot
Rigging the lobbying process: An application of the all-pay auction
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01211819openalex-snapshot
The all-pay auction with complete information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.01.005openalex-snapshot
Behavior in all-pay auctions with incomplete information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00251-5openalex-snapshot
Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6451.00184openalex-snapshot
All–Pay Auctions with Variable Rewards
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00138openalex-snapshot
Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00031openalex-snapshot
A Comparison of Multiple‐Unit All‐Pay and Winner‐Pay Auctions Under Incomplete Information*
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00478.xopenalex-snapshot
Precautionary Bidding in Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.1989.tb00003.xopenalex-snapshot
POLITICALLY CONTESTABLE RENTS AND TRANSFERS*
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.xopenalex-snapshot
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.89.3.694openalex-snapshot
Strategic Behavior in Contests: Reply
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.28.4.836.20510openalex-snapshot
Asymmetric First-Price Auctions—A Perturbation Approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58openalex-snapshot
Optimal Auction Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1911865openalex-snapshot
A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1913516openalex-snapshot
Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1913603openalex-snapshot
Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyer's Point of View

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1553742openalex-extracted
Myopia in Contest: Accumulating Valuation All-Pay Auction Model and Experiment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1815001openalex-extracted
Exclusion in the All-Pay Auction: An Experimental Investigation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1971737openalex-extracted
All-Pay-All Aspects of Political Decision Making
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1976782openalex-extracted
Tiger Women: An All-Pay Auction Experiment on the Gender Heuristic of the Desire to Win
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2179116openalex-extracted
Auctioning Risk: The All-Pay Auction under Mean-Variance Preferences
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2263667openalex-extracted
Can Risk Aversion Mitigate Inefficiencies in Core-Selecting Combinatorial Auctions?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2400092openalex-extracted
Risk- & Regret-Averse Bidders in Sealed-Bid Auctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2799659openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3414openalex-snapshot
Effects of risk aversion in auctions without and with default
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0181-6openalex-snapshot
Large auctions with risk-averse bidders
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0586-6openalex-snapshot
All-pay auctions with endogenous bid timing: an experimental study
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01332-7openalex-snapshot
Auctioning risk: the all-pay auction under mean-variance preferences
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-026-00404-9openalex-snapshot
Auctions with resale and correlated signals
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-016-9504-1openalex-snapshot
Simultaneous versus sequential all-pay auctions: an experimental study
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-015-9454-6openalex-snapshot
Ascending Combinatorial Auctions with Risk Averse Bidders
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9523-yopenalex-snapshot
Less fighting than expected
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-013-0127-1openalex-snapshot
All-pay-all aspects of political decision making
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-018-0144-9openalex-snapshot
Reference-dependent mechanism design
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.10.006openalex-snapshot
The Gender Difference in the Value of Winning
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.09.028openalex-snapshot
The spite motive in third price auctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108751openalex-snapshot
Effects of risk aversion on all-pay auction with reimbursement
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112462openalex-snapshot
Spiteful bidding in first-price all-pay auctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2010.02.040openalex-snapshot
Asymptotic revenue equivalence of asymmetric auctions with interdependent values
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.12.006openalex-snapshot
Optimal Stackelberg strategies for financing a supply chain through online peer-to-peer lending
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2010.02.006openalex-snapshot
An experimental investigation of overdissipation in the all pay auction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.03.002openalex-snapshot
Heterogeneous Risk/Loss Aversion in Complete Information All-Pay Auctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.09.007openalex-snapshot
Contests with three or more heterogeneous agents
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.03.002openalex-snapshot
The optimal sorting of players in contests between groups
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.10.003openalex-snapshot
Spite vs. risk: Explaining overbidding in the second-price all-pay auction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2012.10.007openalex-snapshot
Rent seeking with regretful agents: Theory and experiment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.05.009openalex-snapshot
College admissions with entrance exams: Centralized versus decentralized
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102499openalex-snapshot
Risk preference heterogeneity in group contests
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.12.002openalex-snapshot
Charity auctions for the happy few
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2013.12.008openalex-snapshot
Revenue in Contests with Many Participants
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.rie.2026.101140openalex-snapshot
Equilibrium bidding and expected revenue ranking when bidders have outside options
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-022-20234-3openalex-snapshot
Designing all-pay auctions using deep learning and multi-agent simulation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1108/imds-09-2017-0433openalex-snapshot
Selection of crowdsourcing formats: simultaneous contest vs sequential contest
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1108/jm2-02-2018-0013openalex-snapshot
Selective crowdsourcing with various type task: models and analysis
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/icmss.2011.5999226openalex-snapshot
First-Price Auctions with Risk-Averse Bidders
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/infocom.2014.6847932openalex-snapshot
Profit-maximizing incentive for participatory sensing
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12342openalex-snapshot
A DESIGNER'S CHOICE BETWEEN SINGLE‐PRIZE AND PARALLEL TOURNAMENTS
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12380openalex-snapshot
THE OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF PRIZES IN TOURNAMENTS OF HETEROGENEOUS AGENTS
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12426openalex-snapshot
The Distribution of Talent Across Contests
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12189openalex-snapshot
Auctions with loss‐averse bidders
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2009.01431.xopenalex-snapshot
Tournaments of Weakly Heterogeneous Players
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1542-4774.2010.tb00538.xopenalex-snapshot
Workaholics and Dropouts in Organizations
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12028openalex-snapshot
Heterogeneity of Players and Aggregate Effort in Contests
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12105openalex-snapshot
Information Sharing in Contests
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12345openalex-snapshot
Ambiguity aversion in the all‐pay auction and war of attrition
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/2837029openalex-snapshot
Incentive Mechanism Design for Crowdsourcing
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2013.1845openalex-snapshot
Crowdsourcing with All-Pay Auctions: A Field Experiment on Taskcn
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2022.0287openalex-snapshot
Computing Bayes–Nash Equilibrium Strategies in Auction Games via Simultaneous Online Dual Averaging
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.17077/etd.7ndoofuvopenalex-snapshot
Contests
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3390/g4040608openalex-snapshot
Bimodal Bidding in Experimental All-Pay Auctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3390/g7010005openalex-snapshot
Revenue Implications of Strategic and External Auction Risk
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3917/reco.621.0005openalex-snapshot
L'enchère à offres payantes
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1804.09468openalex-snapshot
Price of Anarchy for Mechanisms with Risk-Averse Agents
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-67043openalex-snapshot
Auctioning risk: The all-pay auction under mean-variance preferences
Editorial review for independent work. ICSAC — the Institute for Complexity Science and Advanced Computing — runs a structured editorial panel for researchers publishing outside journals, and publishes on CiteStamp rails. Submission is free and goes through ORCID: icsacinstitute.org/submit.