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Adjusting prices in the multiple-partners assignment game

https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0171-8
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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2580openalex-snapshot
The English Auction with Differentiated Commodities
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2783openalex-snapshot
A Simple Selling and Buying Procedure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-11696-6_17openalex-snapshot
The Multiple Partners Game
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-46414-0openalex-snapshot
Extremal Methods and Systems Analysis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-46414-0_15openalex-snapshot
Computing the Core of a Market Game
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01753437openalex-snapshot
The assignment game I: The core
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050126openalex-snapshot
The lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes of the multiple partners assignment game
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820200116openalex-snapshot
A labor market with heterogeneous firms and workers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.02.005openalex-snapshot
Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(98)00048-1openalex-snapshot
Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/ccol052139015xopenalex-snapshot
Two-Sided Matching
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/00029890.1962.11989827openalex-snapshot
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/261411openalex-snapshot
Multi-Item Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1112/jlms/s1-10.37.26openalex-snapshot
On Representatives of Subsets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.96.3.602openalex-snapshot
An Efficient Dynamic Auction for Heterogeneous Commodities
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400884179openalex-snapshot
Linear Programming and Extensions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1590/s0034-71402002000300006openalex-snapshot
A simultaneous descending bid auction for multiple items and unitary demand
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1913320openalex-snapshot
Job Matching with Heterogeneous Firms and Workers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1913392openalex-snapshot
Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2554894openalex-snapshot
Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.7249/r366openalex-snapshot
Linear Programming and Extensions

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2442177openalex-extracted
Pairing Games and Markets
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0206-1openalex-snapshot
Stability property of matchings is a natural solution concept in coalitional market games
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-012-0395-4openalex-snapshot
The multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.012openalex-snapshot
Price controls, non-price quality competition, and the nonexistence of competitive equilibrium
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.01.004openalex-snapshot
Comparative statics in the multiple-partners assignment game
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.005openalex-snapshot
Axioms for the optimal stable rules and fair-division rules in a multiple-partners job market
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.07.013openalex-snapshot
Competition and cooperation in a two-sided matching market with replication
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2015001openalex-snapshot
On Marilda Sotomayor'sextraordinary contribution to matching theory
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2015003openalex-snapshot
A survey on assignment markets
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