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Prisoners’ other Dilemma

https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0419-9
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

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Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90111-7openalex-snapshot
Renegotiation-proof equilibria in repeated prisoners' dilemma
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(89)90021-3openalex-snapshot
Renegotiation in repeated games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.01.003openalex-snapshot
Endogenous price leadership
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(02)00552-3openalex-snapshot
Playing safe in coordination games:
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(05)80018-1openalex-snapshot
A new theory of equilibrium selection for games with complete information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00024openalex-snapshot
Repeated Games with Differential Time Preferences
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.4.1695openalex-snapshot
When Does Communication Improve Coordination?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.2.720openalex-snapshot
Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.3.3.164openalex-snapshot
Equilibrium Selection in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Axiomatic Approach and Experimental Evidence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1911077openalex-snapshot
On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1911307openalex-snapshot
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2073314openalex-snapshot
A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2296617openalex-snapshot
A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2951491openalex-snapshot
Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2951777openalex-snapshot
Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2951778openalex-snapshot
The Evolution of Conventions

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

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ItS Payback Time: New Insights on Cooperation in the Repeated Prisoners Dilemma
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Group identity and cooperation in infinitely repeated games
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Approval mechanism to solve prisoner’s dilemma: comparison with Varian’s compensation mechanism
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Asymmetrical expectations of future interaction and cooperation in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game
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Human-algorithm interaction: Algorithmic pricing in hybrid laboratory markets
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Individual strategy choice in the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
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Cooperative strategies in anonymous economies: An experiment
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Motives behind cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
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Partnerships based on Joint Ownership
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Match length realization and cooperation in indefinitely repeated games
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Repeated strategies and negative implementation errors shape induced game types in the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
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Testing Models of Strategic Uncertainty: Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games
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Justice and Equality from Rationality Alone
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Corporate Leniency in a Dynamic World: The Preemptive Push of an Uncertain Future*
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Experiments on Cognition, Communication, Coordination, and Cooperation in Relationships
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The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence
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Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World
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On the Determinants of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: A Survey
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Equilibrium Selection in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Axiomatic Approach and Experimental Evidence
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Payoffs, Beliefs, and Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games
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Reciprocity and cooperation in strategic contexts
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Robustness to incomplete information in repeated games
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Testing Models of Strategic Uncertainty: Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games
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Community Enforcement of Pro-Social and Pro-Environmental Behavior in the Face of Inequalities : A Path to Climate Change Mitigation
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