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Exclusive Versus Non-exclusive Dealing in Auctions with Resale

https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0079-5
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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2325-8012.2002.tb00480.xopenalex-snapshot
Exclusive Dealing through Resellers in Auctions with Stochastic Bidder Participation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/exeh.1999.0717openalex-snapshot
A Theoretical Basis for 19th-Century Changes to the Port of New York Imported Goods Auction
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1993.1013openalex-snapshot
Optimal Auctions Revisited
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0781openalex-snapshot
Partial Pooling at the Reserve Price in Auctions with Resale Opportunities
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-03750-8_7openalex-snapshot
Welcoming the middlemen: restricting competition in auctions by excluding the consumers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-05858-9_17openalex-snapshot
Vickrey auctions with reserve pricing
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-003-0398-8openalex-snapshot
Vickrey auctions with reserve pricing
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580050038openalex-snapshot
Competition among mechanism designers in a common value environment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(02)00010-8openalex-snapshot
Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(99)00063-4openalex-snapshot
First price auctions with resale
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511625930openalex-snapshot
Market Microstructure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/2.3.311openalex-snapshot
Auctions with Resale Markets: An Exploratory Model of Treasury Bill Markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2002.00438.xopenalex-snapshot
Optimal Auction with Resale
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.91.3.399openalex-snapshot
Auctions with Resale Markets: An Application to U.S. Forest Service Timber Sales
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.10.3.135openalex-snapshot
Market Microstructure and Intermediation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2696372openalex-snapshot
Prices and the Winner's Curse

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2099878openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2412429openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3104754openalex-extracted
Trading Networks and Equilibrium Intermediation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3876openalex-snapshot
Resale in second‐price auctions with private entry
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0357-5openalex-snapshot
Introduction to the Symposium
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0383-3openalex-snapshot
Optimal auction with resale—a characterization of the conditions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01283-zopenalex-snapshot
The competitive and welfare effects of long-term contracts with network externalities and bounded rationality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-444-53766-9.00007-0openalex-snapshot
Advances in Auctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2015.08.012openalex-snapshot
Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2010.08.004openalex-snapshot
Optimal mechanisms for an auction mediator
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.06.009openalex-snapshot
Resale in second-price auctions with costly participation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2015.08.004openalex-snapshot
Improved inferences for spatial regression models
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12078openalex-snapshot
STRATEGIC EXCLUSION OF THE HIGHEST‐VALUED BIDDERS IN WHOLESALE AUTOMOBILE AUCTIONS
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00094.xopenalex-snapshot
First-price auctions with resale and with outcomes robust to bid disclosure
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